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Executive Summary 
Early experiences with energy savings certificates (ESCs) have revealed both their merit 
and the challenges associated with them. In the United States, there has been little activity 
to date, so any lessons must be drawn from experiences in Italy, the United Kingdom 
(UK), France, and elsewhere. The staying power of European examples, particularly in 
Italy, demonstrates that ESCs can help initiate more efficiency projects. Although a 
robust market for renewable energy certificates (RECs) has emerged in both the 
voluntary and policy compliance contexts in the United States, ESCs have yet to gain 
significant traction. 
 
However, because of the large number of energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS) 
that have been adopted in recent years in the United States, there is now an increased 
opportunity for ESC trading to emerge. A sharply increased public awareness of the role 
of energy efficiency (EE) in climate change policy also presents a renewed opportunity 
for ESCs, a concept that has been promoted by energy efficiency advocates for some 
time. But given unique challenges to date in the U.S. voluntary market, ESCs may have 
more of a role to play in facilitating EEPS compliance, at least in the short term.  
 
It is unclear at this early stage whether a voluntary market for ESCs will develop as it has 
for RECs. The emergence of a credible, independent national certifying body and 
consistent set of protocols, as well as the success of early examples, most likely will 
influence those prospects. REC markets have shown that there is market potential for 
tradable commodities that represent a public good and an opportunity for consumers to 
“vote with their wallets.” But a voluntary ESC market must cross an additional hurdle 
that RECs have not faced: public acceptance of the notion of taking action that eventually 
results in saving money, and then turning around and selling the proof of that savings for 
yet more income. Is this an unwarranted double benefit? 
 
This report looks at the opportunity presented by ESCs, the unique challenges they bring, 
a comparison with RECs that can inform expectations about ESC market development, 
and the solutions and best practices early ESC market experience have demonstrated. It 
also examines whether there are real market barriers that have kept ESCs from being 
adopted and what structural features are necessary to develop effective trading programs.  
 
The most significant challenge ESCs face is the need to balance the development of 
credible standards with the likelihood that regimes will be developed on very tight 
budgets. Because establishing high standards for certain aspects, such as measurement 
and verification (M&V), can add to transaction costs, these two values must be carefully 
balanced.  
 
In this regard, ESCs can benefit from existing markets and mechanisms to reduce costs. 
They can benefit from the traction that RECs have gained in the marketplace, along with 
the existing infrastructure developed for REC markets, such as tracking systems. These 
systems could be modified relatively easily to accommodate ESC trading. ESCs also can 
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benefit from existing M&V protocols and other data acquired through long-standing 
efficiency and public benefit programs.  
 
The key challenges and design considerations for ESCs are as follows: 
• Balancing the need for market integrity with the need to carefully manage 
transaction costs, including those related to tracking and preventing double-
counting. Maintaining transparency in transactional information and rules 
implementation. 
• Ensuring real, measurable, verified savings that take into account the following 
issues: 
o Establishment of a central, credible certifying body. 
o Additionality tests that ensure a measure is beyond business as usual 
(BAU), effectively handling related issues of free ridership and cream 
skimming. 
o Clear, uniform, rigorous measurement and verification (M&V) based on 
established protocols, across disparate technologies and circumstances. 
o Length of period for which ESCs are issued and up-front ESC issuance 
where appropriate. 
o Alternative compliance payments.  
o Close scrutiny of double-counting through an established system of 
tracking and/or certificate attestation process.1  
o Developing rules for banking ESCs that provide for flexibility and 
increase the value of energy savings but do not overly weaken policies. 
• Communicating a value proposition of separated environmental and social 
attributes. 
• Providing for ESC ownership in a manner that is fair to both facilities investing in 
energy savings and organizations providing energy saving services. For example, 
the installer of high efficiency equipment could give a discount to end users 
paying for the installation, in exchange for ESC ownership.  
• Providing for third-party trading, opening the market beyond obligated entities. 
• Maximizing the ability to piggy-back on to existing electronic REC tracking 
systems. 
• Integrating ESCs with carbon offset and REC markets in a manner that does not 
muddy perceptions of both. 
• Providing early planning for inter-market, interregional, and international trading.  
 
If ESCs are traded under rules that are developed with a solid, well-planned foundation 
and the support of authorized, objective third-party certifying bodies, they can establish 
themselves as an accepted consumer product and have a beneficial effect on the broader 
voluntary demand for energy efficiency. The obstacles remain formidable and it is too 
soon to say whether this potential will find fruition. The opportunity for ESCs’ use in the 
compliance context is the more promising, not only as an end in itself but as a means to 
reap lessons learned, gain public and stakeholder acceptance, and pave the way for the 
voluntary side. 
                                                 
1 Attestations are documents verifying contract paths for a certificate, its chain of ownership. 
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Introduction 
For a number of years, the concept of creating, and even trading, verified fixed units of 
energy savings, through energy efficiency or load management, has been proffered as a 
vehicle to increase the amount of savings implemented in the United States. However, the 
country has only started to adopt energy savings certificates (ESCs), sometimes referred 
to as “white tags,” in the past two years. The energy savings analog to renewable energy 
certificates (RECs), ESCs have the potential to bring the same market-based flexibility to 
energy efficiency that RECs have brought to renewable energy.  
 
Yet that opportunity remains largely untapped, even though energy efficiency has been a 
priority of regulators and conservationists for decades. Public and stakeholder 
understanding of, or belief in, ESCs is likely low, which is similar to early experiences in 
the REC market. This is partly fed by a somewhat persistent perception that energy 
efficiency measures are unreliable, unpredictable, or unenforceable (Hamrin et al. 2007). 
 
Energy efficiency has been called “the first fuel” to signify that saving energy and using 
electricity more efficiently are often considered foundational steps in a multipronged 
environmental strategy. To paraphrase one oft-repeated catchphrase, “the cleanest MWh 
of electricity is the one that is never used.” Many policy makers consider efficiency to be 
the most cost-effective solution to address rapidly increasing demands on congested 
transmission systems (Vine 2008). Following rolling brownouts during the California 
energy crisis of 2000-01, several Western state utility commissions approved increased 
spending for efficiency (Geller 2006).  
 
Today, as energy efficiency is gaining a more popular foothold as a critical solution to 
increasing energy prices, energy security, and global climate change, regulators and 
market participants are giving more attention to ways to encourage its adoption. Several 
studies have identified a critical role for energy efficiency in reducing global carbon 
emissions. In their 2004 identification of 15 “stabilization wedges” to collectively 
mitigate climate change, Princeton analysts Steven Pacala and Robert Socolow identified 
four energy efficiency and conservation wedges, including the potential for the buildings 
sector to cut its carbon emissions by one-fourth, by 2050.2 In a hearing before the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress on July 30, 2008, in which Senator Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) suggested ESC trading to the committee, Jonathan Koomey of the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) testified that energy efficiency is the “fastest, 
cheapest, and cleanest” way to address energy security and climate risks (Koomey 2008). 
 
Still in an early stage of development, ESC markets can play a role in fostering energy 
efficiency, but not before the principles of a well-designed ESC trading platform are 
understood. REC markets provide some useful lessons but not a perfect blueprint. It is too 
soon to know whether momentum will be generated for ESCs analogous to, for example, 
the critical mass that has been created for recycling and recycled products in the United 
States in the past 15 years – after a slow start of low consumer awareness and interest.   
                                                 
2 Each wedge would contribute one gigaton of carbon reduction (GtC/y) by 2054. 
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It is unclear at this early stage whether a voluntary market for ESCs will develop as it has 
for RECs. To no small degree, experience with REC markets has shown that traction in 
voluntary markets can be a function of the success of compliance markets. Although 
there can be no definitive answer to the “chicken-and-egg” causative question of markets 
versus mandates, the early compliance markets for ESCs likely will similarly drive 
voluntary interest more than the other way around. This is because compared with RECs, 
ESCs are perhaps even more tenuous in their ability to be understood and accepted as a 
credible instrument demonstrating real, additional environmental benefit. Unlike RECs, 
ESCs cannot rely on readily verified metered data to demonstrate measurable results, but 
depend instead on comparatively complex measurement and verification protocols, which 
can vary from one compliance regime to another.  
 
To date, four U.S. states, three European countries, and New South Wales have 
incorporated ESCs into policies that establish energy efficiency targets, often referred to 
as energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS). India’s National Action Plan on Climate 
Change contemplates a future national market for ESCs in that country.3 In addition, the 
European Commission is examining whether it should propose an ESC trading scheme 
across the EU.4 In the United States, only Connecticut is actively trading ESCs.  
 
This analysis explores the benefits of ESCs and the obstacles and challenges associated 
with their adoption. We review three major potential ESC markets: compliance, 
voluntary, and carbon. The analysis begins with a review of EEPS policies in the United 
States as the context for future compliance markets, examining ESCs’ potential market 
size in that context. We review the limited voluntary activity in the United States for 
ESCs to date and their potential interaction with carbon offset markets.   
 
The analysis explores the structure of how ESC trading can work in the United States 
using the Connecticut features as an example, and takes a closer look at each design 
feature using European examples. These components include rules for the types of 
projects for which ESCs can be issued; the types of parties who can buy and sell them; 
rules for issuing ESCs, tracking their ownership, and retiring them; rules for who can 
verify and certify that a given ESC is what it purports to be; and the monitoring and 
verification (M&V) protocols to be used for that verification. ESCs in other states and in 
the voluntary market are likely keeping a close eye on how these various elements are 
treated in existing ESC schemes, examining how each translates into the desired result: 
increased cost-effective energy savings activities.  
 
                                                 
3 See http://www.pewclimate.org/international/country-policies/india-climate-plan-summary/06-2008. 
4 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use 
efficiency and energy services and repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC (accessed from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu) 
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What is an Energy Savings Certificate and How is it Used?  
Similar to RECs, ESCs have various names: white tags, energy efficiency certificates or 
credits, and others. But regardless of the moniker, an ESC is simply an instrument 
representing a unit of energy savings that has been measured and verified. ESCs allow 
parties to trade the attributes of energy savings: The ESC represents an ownership right to 
the intangible bundle of societal and environmental benefits created by the fixed quantity 
of energy savings with which the ESC is associated.  
 
An ESC can be represented in units of electricity savings, such as 1 megawatt hour 
(MWh); or in common energy units that enable direct comparisons between gas 
efficiency and electricity savings, such as British thermal units (BTUs) or tons of oil 
equivalent (TOEs).5 ESCs can be designed to incorporate estimated savings (typically 
discounted) over the expected lifetime of the efficiency measure or to represent energy 
savings accrued annually – both approaches have been used. Assigning 1 MWh to an 
ESC likely simplifies its use, both because it makes an ESC more easily comparable to a 
REC (Bertoldi and Huld 2004) and because most EEPS policies in the United States 
focus on electricity savings. 
 
Integral to their design, ESCs are a device that can be used to buy and sell these benefits 
as a separate commodity, either bilaterally or at auction, with the bundle of benefits 
belonging to each successive owner. The ESC is finally credited to the owner of the ESC 
when it is retired, and that owner may make the associated claims concerning the energy 
savings. Similar to RECs, ESCs are intended to be retired only once, for one purpose 
only. Generally, an authorized body is required to ensure credibility in carrying out the 
various identified stages and mechanisms required to establish effective trading schemes 
for ESCs. Figure 1 presents the various stages involved in the creation of ESCs.   
 
                                                 
5 One TWh is equal to one million MWh. In part, the unit is a function of the aim of an ESC scheme: If the 
aim is improved security of supply, the target may be better defined in primary savings units to suit the 
policy aim; if the aim is reliability of electric supply, it may be better defined in kilowatt hours (kWh) 
saved (Bertoldi 2005). 
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Figure 1. Steps in ESC trading schemes 
 
ESCs have potential benefits for both voluntary and compliance markets, so that the 
owner who retires an ESC may do so for private purposes, such as reducing a carbon 
footprint, or to comply with a legal obligation, such as an EEPS. In some cases, an ESC 
may be used as a tool to demonstrate a reduction in carbon emissions. In addition to its 
function as a commodity conveying a property right, an ESC also can be an accounting 
tool, used to demonstrate energy efficiency implementation, or eligibility for certain tax 
incentives or other public subsidies associated with implementing energy efficiency or 
load reduction (Bertoldi et al. 2005).   
 
In compliance markets making use of ESCs, what typically determines whether trading is 
allowed is the size of the market, the number of actors involved  (larger markets with 
more players have more of a reason to encourage trading), and the role that utilities 
would like to play (in-house energy efficiency or outsourcing the expertise). For example 
in France, EDF and Gas de France, the two utilities with the largest targets, tend to 
implement project by themselves to position the companies as energy service providers, 
while in Italy the majority of ESCs are delivered to ESCOs (Bertoldi 2008).6 
 
                                                 
6 Personal communication, Paolo Bertoldi, October 14, 2008. 
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Benefits of ESCs 
In conjunction with – or as an alternative to – other tools used to implement energy 
efficiency programs, ESCs offer unique advantages and disadvantages. As a tradable 
commodity, the main benefit of ESCs that has been espoused is their potential to free 
market forces to drive capital and capabilities to energy savings opportunities.  
 
ESCs can enable energy efficiency to be acquired more cost-effectively. For example, by 
opening up trading to third parties, ESCs could increase participation by private energy 
service companies (ESCOs) in state EEPS compliance markets – a potential advantage 
because of ESCOs’ unique experience and expertise with energy efficiency projects and 
technologies. In some cases, private actors are better able than utilities to identify and 
access high-value energy efficiency opportunities because of their economic interest in 
reaching market segments and geographic regions not easily tapped by utilities. In some 
cases, ESCOs’ advantage may be simply a better ability to acquire energy efficiency 
savings at lower costs.   
 
A similar argument could be made for other third parties in optimal positions to 
implement energy efficiency, such as appliance manufacturers and retailers, commercial 
and industrial energy end users, aggregators for residential measures, and others. Trading 
programs that open markets to third parties could see greater overall savings at a lower 
overall compliance cost, by virtue of empowering these third parties to derive value from 
ESCs. The competition also could result in utilities being pressured to implement their 
own programs more cost-effectively (Loper et al. 2008).  
 
Because of these possibilities, ESCs could potentially increase the amount of energy 
savings should voluntary markets be developed. They also can do so by stretching fixed 
utility energy efficiency budgets further, and by expanding the size of the resource 
potential in states such as Washington or Massachusetts, where utilities are required to 
acquire “all cost-effective energy efficiency.” 
 
Most would agree that if the benefits of private markets can result in greater energy 
savings, then public benefits accrue. The benefits of energy savings and energy efficiency 
are well understood – to the extent that ESCs offer a tool to reduce payback periods and 
thereby encourage more energy efficiency projects to move forward, those benefits may 
be attributable to ESCs as well. They include reduced emissions from fossil fuel-
generated electricity that contribute to climate change, acid rain, and smog and other 
health effects; reduced water consumption; increased energy security; and improved 
ecosystems.  
 
The decrease in electricity and fossil fuel demand brought about by efficiency also 
benefits the economies by delivering cost savings, which may become particularly 
important should U.S. climate change legislation be passed. The cost savings created by 
efficiency may serve to offset the higher energy prices resulting from a cap-and-trade 
system (ACEEE 2008). The economic benefits of energy efficiency can be particularly 
important to impoverished households disproportionately affected by increasing energy 
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costs. Finally, improved energy efficiency can provide a competitive edge for businesses 
in difficult economic climates (see Bertoldi et al. 2005). 
 
Criticisms, Challenges, and Hurdles 
As attractive as the proposition seems, there is some complexity associated with 
developing ESCs as a tradable compliance mechanism. The challenges associated with 
ESCs may partly explain why they are an oft-debated but still largely unexecuted idea in 
the United States, particularly on the voluntary side of the ledger. They include 
determining which savings measures should be eligible for ESCs; managing transaction 
costs and scaling programs to do so; establishing clearly defined and understood 
standards for verifying that savings are real, credible, and accurately measured; and 
accurately tracking ESC ownership. 
 
It is generally anticipated that ESCs add transaction costs to an EEPS scheme (see, for 
example, Vine and Hamrin 2008). To cite one example, perceived high transaction costs 
in the first phase of the Energy Efficient Commitment in Great Britain – about 10% of the 
total costs for lighting projects and about 30% for insulation projects – were found to 
slightly reduce levels of trading (Mundaca 2007). 
 
Transaction Costs 
Higher transaction costs associated with ESCs include those associated with the 
complexity of a greater number of parties involved in implementation of savings 
measures; the complication and cost of issuing, tracking, and certifying ESCs and related 
activities; and the need to pay special attention to M&V standards to ensure market 
integrity. Transaction costs include the direct costs of carrying out an ESC transaction, 
such as the cost of locating, negotiating with, and contracting with transaction 
counterparties (Langniss and Praetorious 2006). Finally, unlike RECs, for which 
generation data are obtained directly through meters and result  in reliable data at low 
transaction costs, energy savings data for the same volume of energy as produced by 
renewable electricity are diffuse and would need to come from many more sources 
(Hamrin et al. 2007). This extensive data collection results in increased transaction costs.  
 
The key question is the extent to which the technical hurdles associated with ESCs 
outweigh the benefits and, taken cumulatively, become too costly relative to the potential 
added revenue or compliance flexibility ESCs are intended to generate. One factor that 
can help tip that balance in favor of the use of ESCs is the case of larger programs with 
larger goals, where costs can be better spread across larger transaction volumes and the 
size of the program can better justify the costs (Vine 2007).  
 
Because of the incrementally higher costs involved in programs incorporating ESCs, each 
element of a well-structured ESC trading program requires a delicate balance between 
credible results that ensure market longevity and the price tag of the mechanisms required 
to achieve that kind of dependability. Transaction costs can be eased by allowing projects 
to be aggregated and measured in the aggregate, rather than on the basis of individual 
projects. As programs have already discovered, M&V for ESC programs can take 
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advantage of the protocols and processes already in place through existing efficiency 
programs. 
 
Measurement & Verification 
The most prominent complication with which policy makers must wrestle – and one that 
does not apply to RECs – is the need to establish clear uniform protocols for measuring 
and verifying savings (M&V) across disparate technologies and circumstances. M&V is 
always an important issue for energy efficiency programs, whether or not ESCs are used. 
It is an added dimension to be considered in assessing whether progress REC markets 
have made in the United States is an indicator of the potential of ESC markets here.  
 
Measuring the renewable energy associated with RECs is usually simply a matter of 
reading and reporting metered data for the process of REC issuance. Measuring and 
verifying savings resulting from energy efficiency improvements is considerably more 
complicated and can add significant costs to ESC transactions.  
 
Fundamentally, M&V often is not a straightforward exercise, because measuring 
reductions in energy consumption depends on a baseline or reference scenario, a “before” 
picture, which is generally a moving target that must be accurately projected. Very often, 
by the time energy savings are achieved, “business as usual” is no longer business as 
usual, because facility demand or energy use patterns have changed – typically, demand 
has increased.  
 
M&V and ESCs 
Yet there is agreement among stakeholders and policy makers, reflected in the existing 
European ESC policies and the ESC literature, that clear, consistent M&V protocols are 
crucial to the long-term success of ESC trading schemes. They agree that consistent 
M&V is the lynchpin to ensuring that opening ESC trading to private third parties does 
not undermine the credibility of this new market seeking momentum. Without strong 
M&V standards, savings estimates can become inflated and projects that would have 
been completed under business-as-usual scenarios could result in a deflation in ESC 
value, undermining the investments in energy efficiency intended by the EEPS (Loper et 
al. 2008). M&V standards also are crucial for the task of measuring the “shelf life” of 
projects – how many years should ESCs be issued for a project based on how long the 
project is yielding real savings and the length of its payback period. In regimes where 
ESCs are issued up front for the life of a project, M&V determines how much the future 
value of ESCs should be discounted based on risks that the shelf life might be altered 
during the period of expected savings, a task that is something of a hybrid between policy 
and engineering considerations.  
 
Although ESCs will benefit from years of M&V development in the broader energy 
efficiency markets and protocols that have been established, most notably the 
International Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP 2001), they 
present unique challenges. First, ESC markets may be broader than individual utility 
service territories or states, requiring M&V standards to be harmonized across 
jurisdictions. Second, more robust markets for ESCs may include a broader range of 
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energy efficiency measures that may be implemented in a broader range of applications, 
potentially requiring additional M&V protocols to be developed. Third, a larger and more 
diverse set of entities may be involved in implementing projects, requiring some 
combination of training and the development of simplified M&V options. Third-party 
ESC trading can complicate M&V simply because of the need to apply and verify 
protocols for a diverse and numerous set of companies.  
 
Not harmonized correctly, each of these potential areas of inconsistency could contribute 
to weakening faith in ESC trading in general, because of such risks as companies 
receiving windfall benefits without true efficiency gains. M&V for renewable energy is 
generally not as complex, because renewable generation data is metered and generally 
verified by the control area operator, who is already verifying them for transmission 
purposes (Hamrin 2007).  
 
Developing a robust, liquid market for ESCs depends partly on the consistency among 
the methodologies and norms for establishing M&V protocols and for clarity among 
parties as to what is actually being sold and purchased. If interstate, national, or even, 
eventually, international trading were to develop, consistency among protocols would 
prevent transactional parties from being mired unnecessarily in trying to compare apples 
and oranges for the same technologies. It is useful to identify the benefit of such protocol 
standardization at this early stage of market design and consider all best practices. For 
now, there is no concerted effort at such coordination, although there are many 
nongovernmental organizations that look across such boundaries and attempt to 
communicate standards. 
 
Tracking Ownership 
Another key technical hurdle to successful ESC trading programs is the requirement for 
tracking systems. Where trading is allowed, it is necessary to track ESCs’ chain of 
ownership to ensure against double-counting. Accommodating the need to ensure market 
integrity must be accomplished at a reasonable cost, to avoid undercutting the small 
operating margins many efficiency projects carry. Moreover, in future trading regimes, 
tracking systems may need to integrate ESCs with RECs and carbon offsets to avoid 
confusion, duplication of efforts, and the potential for double-counting.  
 
Tracking can be a costly element to an ESC trading scheme, particularly when it is done 
manually through an attestation process and not through an automated system. Along 
with M&V, the need to track ownership can create incremental costs over those of 
efficiency programs that do not involve ESCs, especially when administrative procedures 
are complex (Langniss and Praetorious 2006). There are, however, cases where this cost 
can be significantly mitigated by “piggy-backing” on automated generation attribute 
tracking systems currently used for RECs.  
 
In Connecticut, rule-makers have attempted to do exactly that, using the New England 
Power Pool (NEPOOL) Generation Information System (GIS). In conjunction with 
market participants, APX Inc., the company that has provided the Web-based platform 
for most of the REC-based trading schemes, has anticipated the need for automated ESC 
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tracking. Of existing United States REC tracking systems, only the North American 
Renewables Registry – often referred to as the “default” system because it covers all 
geographic regions not covered by the systems that pre-dated its launch in May 2008 – 
was designed to track ESCs for a contemplated voluntary market, in addition to RECs.  
 
Credibility 
Ensuring that savings are “real and additional” is crucial to the success of voluntary ESC 
markets. Measures must be real, surplus, verifiable, and permanent – the R.S.V.P. of 
credible offsets. For efficiency, the primary hurdles are proving that measures are “real” 
and “surplus” or additional to what would otherwise have occurred.  Because many 
efficiency measures are cost-effective over a relatively short period of time, determining 
standards for what measures are additional to those that would have occurred under 
business as usual is important.   
 
Cream Skimming 
ESC schemes must also deal with “cream skimming,” participation in ESC schemes of 
projects with short payback periods. In their design, ESC trading programs must 
determine the number of years they will allow various project types to generate ESCs, 
based on the length of time they are expected to generate real savings and the time it will 
take for those savings to provide the full payback of the initial investment. Providing 
ESCs to projects past this estimated period can result in windfalls to project owners and 
higher compliance costs. Some trading programs limit the period for which ESCs may be 
issued for projects. To reduce the relative incentives for cream skimming, trading 
programs can offer ESC issuance for longer periods of time, so that those projects with 
longer payback periods can better compete, because they would qualify for more ESCs 
over the life of that payback period. If, for example, a regime only issues ESCs for five 
years, projects with payback periods of five years or less would gain a competitive 
advantage. Lengthening issuance periods in this way can increase the financial incentive 
for these less cost-competitive projects with longer payback periods, improving overall 
additionality standards. Some have argued that issuing ESCs for projects with short 
payback periods promotes a broader, healthier market for energy efficiency, because such 
projects help demonstrate the compelling economic benefits that tend to be particularly 
strong where payback periods are particularly short.  
 
Free Ridership 
ESC programs bringing an additional revenue stream to energy savings projects must 
concern themselves with “free riders,” projects that were going to be implemented 
regardless of the additional revenue from ESCs, generally for nonenergy reasons. The 
preferred approach to accounting for free ridership is to adjust, or discount, the gross 
energy savings attributable to the program based on a “derate” factor, a percentage based 
on assumptions about the level of free ridership, with the resulting figure sometimes 
referred to as “net energy savings.” These assumptions are made through studies or 
market experience (Vine 2008). The intent behind the use of such assumptions is to offer 
an approach to free ridership that is reasonable, credible, and supports the additionality 
threshold, while avoiding overly burdensome enforcement costs.  
 
 12
Through such adjustments, regulators can prevent free ridership from causing an over-
estimation of the cost-effectiveness of a program when evaluating it. In a review of 
energy efficiency protocols in the Northeast United States, states had different rules on 
what adjustments were applied to gross savings to calculate net savings (Michals and 
Titus 2006). Other regimes employ protocols to exclude projects that are likely to be free 
riders from receiving ESCs, instead of applying a derate factor. In the end, policy makers 
must determine the right way to balance those questions in their unique situation.  
 
Trading as a Potential Weakening Force in EEPS Design 
Some argue that there are instances for which trading could create unintended 
consequences of weakening or narrowing EEPS policies, or making them more instead of 
less expensive. It could steer resources away from key energy saving policies and 
measures that may not qualify for ESCs, because the savings they create typically would 
not be attributable to individual parties obligated under the EEPS. Such policies include 
building codes, appliance standards, state consumer awareness and information 
campaigns, and tax incentives (Loper et al. 2008). Where an EEPS policy does not 
contemplate trading and therefore assigning ownership to ESCs from such projects, 
policy makers might be more inclined to credit these project types, resulting in their 
broader implementation.  
 
Others argue that the introduction of market forces can result in higher rather than lower 
compliance costs for energy efficiency, because pricing via the market rather than 
through a cost basis can result in prices higher than pure cost-based pricing should 
deliver, with the difference increasing profit margins instead of project investment (Wolff 
2008). For example, in states that have faced supply shortages in meeting RPS 
requirements, supply/demand imbalances have resulted in higher REC prices than what 
pure costs suggest they should be, because that is what the market would bear. Similarly, 
some argue that ESC short-supply scenarios can result in higher prices that do not 
necessarily yield more projects. However, energy efficiency projects do not face the same 
barriers as renewables, with respect to siting and transmission constraints, or the need for 
the same kind of long-term contracts; therefore, fewer barriers to their implementation 
exist. Theoretically, if markets operate without barriers, short-term overpayments should 
be addressed by the marketplace as a greater number of projects are implemented and 
drive down prices.    
 
Another criticism of ESCs concerns local air-quality benefits, if emissions reductions are 
a primary goal of an EEPS policy. If entities were permitted to buy out-of-state ESCs, 
they might be effectively “buying” their way out of part of their obligation and 
undermining any local air quality benefits. However, because obligated entities have not 
been permitted to purchase ESCs from out-of-state projects, this has not been an issue for 
EEPS states thus far. Along similar lines, out-of-state ESCs would deprive a state of the 
reduced energy costs, reduced risk mitigation benefits, and any economic development 
benefits associated with energy efficiency. The same issue has been raised for RECs, 
which is why some RPS states have required physical delivery of renewable energy into 
their states to accompany compliance RECs.   
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Challenges Unique to a National EEPS 
It has also been argued that ESC trading could effectively reduce the stringency of a 
national EEPS (should one be implemented in the United States), if ESCs from so-called 
“business-as-usual” (BAU) projects, like those implemented for a pre-existing state 
EEPS, were allowed to be sold into a federal compliance market (Loper et al. 2008).  
In such a scenario, a utility with excess ESCs after meeting its EEPS requirement could 
sell those ESCs to another utility in lieu of that other utility achieving additional savings 
to meet its federal EEPS requirement.  
 
In this case, trading among utilities could allow credit for more BAU programs, and thus 
reduce the effective stringency of the EEPS. Some contend that providing for national 
trading could allow obligated parties in states with stringent efficiency policies (with 
tougher standards for what qualifies as additional or a broader definition of the baseline 
of business-as-usual projects) to effectively weaken those standards by buying ESCs 
from states with less-aggressive baseline policies. In addition to undermining the 
stringent states’ policy, this could provide an undesirable reward to the laggard states 
(Loper et al. 2008). 
 
Markets for ESCs 
There are three major markets or potential markets for ESCs: EEPS or RPS compliance, 
voluntary, and carbon; carbon markets also include both voluntary and compliance 
markets. All of these markets can benefit from consistent M&V rules and a clear third-
party certification body. But some issues are unique to each. 
 
Compliance Markets 
EEPS policies that create long-term targets for energy efficiency have emerged in 15 U.S. 
states (Figure 2, and Tables 1 and 2).7 The fact that all but three of these states have 
done so in the past three years demonstrates a clear trend and a renewed state interest.  
 
EEPS policies generally apply to utilities or load-serving entities, requiring them to 
demonstrate a quantity of energy savings that usually increases during the life of the 
requirement. EEPS policies are comparable to RPS policies and, in some instances, 
energy efficiency targets have been incorporated into an expanded RPS. In other cases, 
EEPS policies are enacted with targets that are entirely separate from and independent of 
RPS targets; often, this occurs in states with an already well-established RPS.8   
                                                 
7 Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency. DSIRE: Rules, Regulations, & Policies for 
Energy Efficiency: http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/regee.cfm?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=1&RE=1 
Accessed July 2008. Four other states have exceptional EE standards, as follows: In Washington State, the 
requirement is to acquire all achievable cost-effective EE, but with no specific target;  Massachusetts has 
the same policy. In Vermont, the state has a contract with a third-party administrator to run their energy 
efficiency programs, and the contract includes a performance incentive based on energy savings. Finally, 
Virginia has an aspirational policy, not established through legislation or regulatory order.  
8 Ohio has a stand-alone EEPS and also includes energy efficiency within a broader “alternative energy 
resource” portfolio standard. 
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Table 1. States with Electricity EEPS Stand-Alone Policies 
State (Date 
Enacted) 
Obligated 
Parties  Final Savings Target 
California 
(2004) IOUs 
Electricity: 2,631 GWh/yr (2013) Natural Gas: 444 
MMtherms (2013) 
Connecticut 
(2005) 
Retail 
electric 
suppliers  4% of retail sales (2010). 
Colorado 
(2007) IOUs 
5% of both retail sales and peak demand (2018, 
cumulatively from measures implemented since 2006) 
Illinois (2007) 
IOUs > 
100,000 
customers 
2% of energy delivered (2015) and 1.1% peak demand 
(2018) 
Maryland 
(2008) 
Distribution 
utilities 10% reduction in per capita electricity use by 2015 
Michigan 
(2008) 
All electric 
utilities 3.3% of retail sales (2012) 
Minnesota 
(2007) 
All electric 
utilities 1.5% of retail sales (2010) 
New Mexico 
(2008) 
IOUs and 
Munis 10% of retail sales (2020) 
New York 
(2008) IOUs 15%  of retail sales (2015) 
Ohio (2008) 
Distribution 
utilities 2% of retail sales (2019) 
Texas 
(1997/2007) 
Distribution 
utilities 20% of load growth (2009) 
Notes:  
1) Colorado's natural gas goal has not been set yet.  
2) Connecticut's EE requirement is a separate class of measures within the RPS; as such, it functions as a 
standalone EEPS. 4% includes electricity, natural gas, and CHP measures.  
3) ) At least 1% of the Minnesota target must be met through utility conservation programs. The other 0.5% 
may come from a combination of  new appliance standards and building codes, market transformation 
programs, waste heat recovery, and utility infrastructure upgrades. 
4) IOUs are investor-owned utilities. 
5) Munis are municipal utilities. 
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Table 2. States with Electricity Energy Savings Integrated within RPS 
State (Date 
Enacted) 
Obligated 
Parties  Final RPS Target 
Maximum % that 
Can be Satisfied 
with Efficiency 
Hawaii (2004) 
All electric 
utilities 20% (2020)  
50% 
Nevada (2005) 
IOUs and 
competitive 
retail 
suppliers 20% (2015);  
25% 
North Carolina 
(2007) 
All electric 
utilities 
IOUs: 12.5% (2021); 
POUs: 10% (2018) 
40% for IOUs; 
unlimited for POUs. 
Ohio (2008) 
Distribution 
utilities 25% (2025)  50% 
Pennsylvania 
(2004) 
Retail electric 
suppliers    10% (2020) 
 n/a 
Notes: 
1) POUs are publicly owned utilities. 
2) In Nevada, nonresidential measures are not to exceed 50% 
3) In Pennsylvania, energy efficiency is in a resource tier together with waste coal, large hydroelectric 
generation, and other “alternative energy” resources. The tier requirement is 10% by 2020.  
 
EEPS targets may be expressed as a percentage of demand, peak demand, load growth, or 
retail sales. In some cases, this is because of varying policy objectives, such as reduction 
in load growth to reduce the need for new power plants, reduction in peak demand, 
creating economic opportunity, or often a combination of factors. They vary as well in 
the types of projects that qualify. In some cases, they include a “weighting” multiplier 
feature that effectively increases the incentive to implement preferable projects, such as 
certain types of energy efficiency projects or projects meant to reduce peak load.  
 
Where trading is allowed, utilities required to comply with an EEPS that exceeds that 
requirement can sell ESCs to other obligated parties that fall short of their requirement. 
The result, at least in theory, is a less-expensive route to achieve an equivalent amount of 
savings. Some energy efficiency advocates have argued for a national EEPS with a 
trading regime that would create a more robust market, bringing broader opportunities for 
capital to flow to projects (ACEEE 2008). In such a regime, both buyers and sellers of 
ESCs would have a more robust set of counterparties through which to use the market to 
meet requirements in a cost-effective manner.  
 
Only four states have introduced ESCs into their EEPS policy – Connecticut, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania, and most recently Michigan. In only one of the four – Connecticut – have 
ESCs been actively traded for compliance purposes. Michigan’s EEPS, enacted in 
October 2008, explicitly allows the use of ESCs, called “energy optimization credits,” 
although trading is not allowed initially.9 In the EEPS, the Michigan Legislature calls for 
the state’s public utilities commission to establish a certification, tracking, and 
accounting program for the credits; a date after which energy savings must be achieved to 
                                                 
9 See Michigan Senate Bill No. 213, Sections 83-87. 
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be considered additional; and a method for allowance for issuance and use of the credits 
in electronic form. 
 
At least a few other states (North Carolina and Illinois) have opened dockets or are 
otherwise gathering input on ESC trading for their consideration within an EEPS policy. 
Because EEPS policies are still very new in the United States, there is little experience 
from which to draw lessons as to whether ESCs can, and should, help with their 
compliance. Given the significant role of RECs as a tradable commodity in RPS policies 
to date and some success with using ESCs for European targets, the question of whether 
ESCs can play an analogous role for U.S. EEPS compliance is worth exploring. 
Moreover, bills may be introduced to enact a federal EEPS in the United States in the 
coming years, or energy efficiency targets within a federal RPS; it is important to 
understand the way that ESCs work, and their strengths and weaknesses, in those 
contexts as well.  
 
In 2007, a rejected amendment to the House of Representatives version of what later 
became the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 would have created a 
national EEPS, requiring energy efficiency improvements equal to 10% of 2019 
electricity sales and 5% of 2019 natural gas sales in 2020. Should a future national EEPS 
policy be implemented, either within or separate from a national RPS, understanding the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of allowing utilities to purchase ESCs in addition 
to, or instead of, implementing their own energy savings programs is particularly 
important. The lessons learned from existing examples of trading regimes should be 
applied.  
 
ESC Interaction with RECs and RPS Markets 
ESCs can interact with REC and RPS markets in a number of ways. If ESCs are 
denominated in MWh units and represent electricity savings, they potentially could be 
used interchangeably with RECs in voluntary REC markets. Consumers could purchase 
ESCs to offset each MWh of electricity consumed, similar to how RECs are used by 
customers today. They also could be used essentially interchangeably with RECs in those 
compliance markets in which both efficiency and renewables are eligible to meet a single 
target.   
 
Combined efficiency and renewable energy portfolio targets are a relatively new concept, 
with most of these policies adopted since 2006. Therefore, experience with these policies 
is very limited. As discussed earlier, several states have designed policies that establish 
separate targets for efficiency, while others have established a single target in which 
efficiency essentially compete on a cost or other basis against renewable energy sources. 
In Pennsylvania, efficiency is included in a tier of resources with other “alternative 
energy sources” such as waste coal, large hydro, and certain forms of biomass.   
 
The amount of efficiency stimulated by an EEPS or RPS is a function of the cost of 
efficiency compared with the resources against which the efficiency competes. The tier 
structure – and specifically what other resources are in a given tier together with energy 
savings – is an important design element of any RPS or EEPS policy.  
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North Carolina’s RPS policy, which places efficiency within a tier of resources including 
some forms of renewable energy that are expected to be more expensive than the 
efficiency measures, tends to stimulate the efficiency measures, because they are cost-
competitive. A standard similar to Pennsylvania’s – where efficiency is included within a 
tier of resources that also includes lower-cost alternative energy resources such as waste 
coal, large hydro, and certain biomass technologies – allows obligated parties to take 
advantage of these lower-cost alternatives and forego or reduce the need to implement 
efficiency for compliance.  
 
In most states for which energy savings requirements are rolled into a combined RPS, 
ESCs are likely to trade at lower prices than RECs and will likely replace demand for 
renewables. This is why certain states capped efficiency to capture energy savings 
opportunities without sacrificing renewable energy development entirely. Separate tiers 
for efficiency and renewables are likely to provide more certainty to the market, because 
the quantities needed of each resource could be more clearly delineated. Such a 
combination may encourage the adoption of efficiency in the short term and push the 
development of renewable resources in latter years, delaying the market’s ability to 
develop manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure. Separate tiers would enable the 
industries to develop in tandem with more market certainty.  
 
In cases where both efficiency and renewables can be used to meet the same standard, the 
introduction of ESCs could streamline the compliance process through a more liquid 
market, by combining REC and ESC trading into a single platform and tracking registry. 
Similar to RECs, ESCs can bring a market mechanism to compliance, which draws funds 
more easily toward opportunities through competition for the least-cost resources. At 
least in theory, such a mechanism can reduce compliance costs, enabling more projects 
and, consequently, the ability to develop more stringent standards.  
 
If ESCs are introduced for compliance, states may need to consider whether to develop a 
separate alternative compliance payment (ACP) for efficiency. In Connecticut, the ACP 
for the Class III energy efficiency targets is $31/MWh, compared to $55/MWh for Class I 
(renewables). However, in situations where both efficiency and renewables are eligible to 
meet the same standard, then one alternative compliance payment could be used.  
 
Because combined EEPS/RPS policies are in the early stages of implementation, and 
none of these states have yet incorporated ESC trading, there is little experience with 
which to derive lessons learned. However, many of these states have implemented REC 
trading for RPS compliance, so they are well-situated to undertake ESC trading.  
 
Compliance Market Size Potential  
In this section, we estimate the potential U.S. ESC compliance market. Attempting to 
forecast the size potential for the voluntary market will inevitably be a partly speculative 
exercise, given the innovative nature of the product and the difficulty in creating valid 
analogies – most notably the imperfect analogies sometimes made with RECs.  
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Although only four states (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Michigan) currently 
allow the use of ESCs for compliance, progress in addressing some of the technical and 
institutional challenges to implementing ESCs could lead to broader adoption among 
states with long-term energy efficiency savings obligations, and among states with 
binding greenhouse gas emission targets. Until such time, current U.S. market activity is 
limited to Connecticut. The market in Connecticut is relatively large, because “Class III 
credits” (ESCs) are the sole method for EEPS compliance there – for 2008, that 
requirement was about 627,000 MWh (2% of retail sales); the 2009 requirement is 
910,000 MWh (3% of retail sales). 
 
As a benchmark for gauging the potential ESC compliance market in the United States, 
the analysis estimates the ESC market volume under the scenario where all 15 U.S. states 
with existing long-term energy efficiency obligations allow the use of ESCs for 
compliance. This estimate could be viewed as an upper bound, because it assumes 
universal adoption among these 15 states. However, additional states may enact long-
term energy efficiency obligations (and/or binding greenhouse gas emission targets) over 
time, potentially widening the opportunities for ESCs as a compliance instrument.  In 
addition, ESCs potentially could be used for compliance in states without any form of 
long-term energy efficiency obligation, but where regulators establish shorter-term (e.g., 
1- to 3-year) utility energy efficiency program budgets and savings targets.  
 
Table 3 presents the ESC market potential among the 15 states currently with long-term 
energy efficiency obligations. We estimate a potential market volume of more than 
35,000 GWh in 2010, growing to approximately 86,000 GWh in 2015, and 125,000 GWh 
by 2020. To put these figures into context, 125,000 GWh is more than one-and-a-half 
times the total U.S. electric utility energy efficiency savings in 2006, as reported by 
EIA.10  Illinois, New York, Ohio, Michigan, California, and Maryland represent the 
largest-potential ESC compliance markets among the 15 states, comprising about 77% of 
the total market potential in 2020. 
 
Table 3. Potential ESC Compliance Market in States with Existing Long-Term Energy 
Efficiency Obligations 
State ESC Market Potential (GWh) 
2010 2015 2020
Stand-alone EEPS 
CA 15,491 18,654 11,021
CT 1,125 1,330 1,400
CO 1,101 1,171 1,233
IL 1,604 11,441 24,449
MD 2,441 7,470 10,298
MI 885 6,372 11,564
MN 684 4,255 7,361
NM 401 936 1,604
NY 6,438 16,255 21,979
OH 1,115 7,523 17,160
                                                 
10 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat9p6.html 
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TX 3,193 4,463 4,769
Subtotal 33,766 80,507 114,996
Energy Efficiency Included in Broader Portfolio Standard 
HI 308 878 1,316
NC 0 2,713 6,902
NV 1,062 2,119 2,525
PA 0 0 0
Subtotal 1,370 5,711 10,742
 
Total 35,136 86,217 125,738
General methodology: 
(1) Several states (CA, NY, MD and MN) have adopted EEPS policies that encompass policy interventions beyond 
utility or third-party administered energy efficiency incentive programs – including, for example, building codes and 
appliance standards.  For these states, the values shown in the table reflect only the portion of those broader 
targets required (or likely) to be met through energy efficiency incentive programs. 
(2) States with standalone EEPS policies typically specify their targets in terms of either (a) incremental annual 
savings as a percentage of retail sales or (b) cumulative savings over some time span as a percentage of retail 
sales in a given year.  To translate these targets into an ESC market volume, we assume that energy efficiency 
measures installed to meet the standard would be eligible to receive ESCs for ten years following installation, which 
is consistent with the ESC eligibility period adopted in Connecticut and is in line with typical energy efficiency 
measure lifetimes.   
(3) States that allow energy efficiency measures to qualify as an eligible resource within a broader portfolio standard 
typically place a cap on the percentage of the total target that can be met with energy efficiency.  Except where 
noted below, we assume that energy efficiency is used for compliance to the maximum extent allowed: 25% of total 
portfolio resources in Nevada, 25% for IOUs in North Carolina, and 50% in Hawaii. 
(4) For most states, GWh targets were derived from percentage targets, which required a retail sales forecast.  We 
developed retail sales forecasts by applying the census region-based growth rates from EIA’s 2008 Annual Energy 
Outlook to actual 2006 retail sales in each state.  In deriving the GWh targets from retail sales forecasts, we 
account for any exemptions included in each state’s RPS or EEPS policy (e.g., exemptions for publicly owned 
utilities or for large customers). 
 
Key state-specific assumptions, conventions, and data sources:  
(1) California: The market potential estimate shown for 2010 is based on the 2004-2013 goals adopted for the 
state’s IOUs.  The CPUC recently adopted Total Market Gross goals for 2012 -2020, which encompass energy 
efficiency activities beyond utility programs.  The 2015 and 2020 market potential estimates shown in the table 
reflect only the portion of the Total Market Gross goals achievable through utility programs, as determined in the 
study (Itron 2008) upon which the goals are based. 
(2) Colorado: State law requires that the Colorado PUC establish an EEPS for the state’s two IOUs, and specifies 
the minimum cumulative savings through 2018.  The Colorado PUC has established a more-aggressive EEPS for 
Xcel, but has not yet established an EPPS for the state’s other IOU, Aquila.  As such, the market potential 
estimates shown in the table reflect the targets established for Xcel by the Colorado PUC and, for Aquila, the 
statutory minimum target.   
(3) Connecticut: We assume that ESCs from all C&LM-funded C&I measures will be used to the extent available 
(accounting for the 10-year credit life), and that any remaining EEPS requirement will be met through CHP. 
(4) New Mexico: The state’s EEPS specifies targets for cumulative savings through 2014 and through 2020.  To 
estimate the ESC market potential for 2010 and 2015, we assume a linear ramp-up to the 2014 and 2020 
cumulative savings goals. 
(5) New York: The values shown in the table for 2010 and 2015 are taken directly from a NY PSC order that 
developed annual savings targets for utility and NYSERDA-implemented programs, based on the overall statewide 
EEPS of 15% reduction by 2015.  The 2020 market potential estimate assumes that programmatic efforts continue 
past 2015 at the same level as projected for 2015. 
(6) North Carolina: Unlike IOUs, publicly owned utilities (POUs) have no cap on the portion of their RPS target that 
can be met with energy efficiency.  In estimating the ESC market potential, we assume that, after all RPS set-
asides are met and the large hydro allowance (30%) is fully exhausted, POUs meet 75% of their residual RPS 
target with efficiency.   
(7) Pennsylvania: The state’s Alternative Resource Portfolio Standard has two tiers, one for renewables and another 
for various “alternative” resources, including energy efficiency, large hydroelectric power, clean coal, municipal 
solid waste, and various other generation resources.  Given that sufficient existing large hydroelectric generation 
exists to fully meet Pennsylvania’s Tier 2 standard, we assume that a market for tradable ESCs is unlikely to 
develop in that state, and thus the market potential shown is zero for all years. 
(8) The Texas EEPS is specified in terms of minimum peak demand savings as a percentage of peak demand 
growth, and applies only to the state’s regulated distribution utilities.  We developed a peak demand forecast for the 
distribution utilities, based on the statewide peak demand forecast in Eliot et al. (2007).  We estimated energy 
savings based on the ratio of energy-to-peak demand savings from energy efficiency programs implemented during 
2003-2007 (Frontier Associates, 2008).  
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Voluntary Markets 
For several years, energy efficiency advocates and others have touted a voluntary market 
for ESCs, based on their potential to provide the same level of market flexibility and 
incentives to energy efficiency opportunities as RECs have to renewable energy. The 
appeal is especially true for carbon emissions, because the location of the energy 
efficiency measure reducing carbon emissions makes little difference. The notion is that 
parties who have exhausted their own opportunities to reduce their energy consumption, 
or do so cost-effectively, should have a mechanism to reduce their footprint further by 
supporting projects regardless of geographic location. Capital investment could flow 
toward the most cost-effective opportunities, competition would be increased along with 
consumer awareness and demand, and payback times could be shortened to drive forward 
even the “higher-hanging” fruit. 
 
But despite the promise and the fact that the idea has been discussed for years, a 
voluntary U.S. market for ESCs has been very slow in developing. There have been some 
spot transactions, particularly of ESCs in the form of carbon offsets. In this form, the 
energy savings can be certified by credible third parties through established protocols not 
yet available to ESCs in noncarbon contexts. But there has been neither momentum nor 
structural support for a standalone ESC voluntary market. There are at least four 
significant reasons why the voluntary ESC market has not yet become a significant 
market tool in the United States, compared with the robust voluntary REC market of 
more than 10 million purchased MWhs per year.  
 
The first is communicating the value proposition. Much has been written about this 
difficulty with respect to RECs. But ESCs as a tradable commodity may be a more 
difficult concept to communicate (and therefore to market) than even RECs, their  
renewable energy counterpart. ESCs may find difficulty with an additional hurdle RECs 
have not faced: public acceptance of the notion of taking action that results in saving 
money, and then turning around and selling the proof of that savings for yet more 
income. Is this an unwarranted double benefit?  
 
In a time when institutional energy users are highly motivated to reduce their carbon 
footprint and “green” their public brand, a purchase of RECs to displace electricity use is 
a fairly straightforward means of accomplishing both. Although energy efficiency is at 
least as effective a means, the buying, and especially the selling, of the results of energy 
efficiency measures in certificate form could invite stakeholder scrutiny or accusations of 
“greenwashing.” 
 
At the least, voluntarily buying or selling ESCs would tend to generate a level of 
confusion and scrutiny aimed at market participants that would not apply to a company 
merely deploying its own energy efficiency program and “keeping” the certificates that 
demonstrate saved energy. For example, could a seller claim its energy savings for 
branding or carbon purposes? Or, would a buyer choosing ESCs over more costly energy 
efficiency measures that would have affected its own operations want to make energy 
savings claims under those circumstances? Both scenarios could invite the possibility of 
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negative attention during a time when many companies are paying close attention to both 
their carbon footprint and the greenness of their brand.  
 
Second, as has been discussed, measuring and verifying energy savings always comes 
with challenges. But voluntary markets tend to be national instead of confined to states or 
smaller geographic regions, increasing the risk that a given ESC, or a MWh of savings 
for a given project, does not carry the same value to the buyer as it does to the seller. For 
example, the same project could have a shorter payback period in one region of the 
country, where energy prices are higher, than in another region. Voluntary markets may 
require even more stringent additionality requirements than compliance programs, 
particularly if the ESCs are procured for their carbon benefits. If consumers voluntarily 
pay a premium for the ESCs, they need some assurance that they are supporting 
efficiency measures and savings that would not have otherwise occurred. Otherwise, 
consumers simply may be helping the bottom line of corporations where efficiency 
measures are installed, without actually driving the development of new projects.   
 
The third reason, related to the second, is the fact that no objective third party has stepped 
into the role of “certifying body” to address M&V and additionality issues, on a de facto 
if not officially recognized basis. Because of the scrutiny that can come on the voluntary 
side, certification is particularly important, as it has been for voluntary REC markets. 
Environmental Resources Trust-Winrock has promulgated a set of draft rules for the 
voluntary market, with an ESC certification called “Ecopower,” including a model 
“certification template.” As of September 2008, ERT-Winrock has not yet certified any 
transactions and was still in a comment period for the model rules.  
 
Fourth, the ESC voluntary market has not yet received the comparable boost from 
compliance markets that significantly helped the U.S. REC market. During the early 
development of U.S. REC markets from 2000-03, marketers were unsure whether RECs 
would enjoy longevity in the market, given the innovative nature of the product and the 
challenge in communicating its value proposition to consumers. At the time, a slowly 
increasing voluntary demand for RECs likely played some role in their early use by states 
as a vehicle to facilitate RPS compliance. But with the benefit of hindsight, evidence of 
the converse seems clearer: It is most likely that states’ legal sanction of RECs for 
compliance purposes lent the credibility that RECs needed to increase buyers’ comfort 
levels, which allowed the product to gain a lasting foothold in the voluntary market. For 
example, when the New England states and Texas first elected to use RECs for RPS 
compliance in 2002, the entire U.S. voluntary market for certified RECs was less than 
80,000 MWh; by the end of 2003, that figure had increased nearly fivefold (Bird and 
Swezey 2004).  
 
New York Voluntary ESC Pilot Program  
The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is 
developing a pilot voluntary ESC program, which it expects to officially launch with its 
first ESC auction by spring 2009. The program is designed to create environmental 
benefits by increasing the implementation of energy efficiency measures, improving the 
transparency and credibility of ESC markets, and addressing potential emissions 
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“leakage” (i.e., shifting power generation to outside of the regulated region) that could 
undermine the goals of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), for which New 
York is a participating state.  
 
Under the program, NYSERDA is aggregating ESCs from qualifying energy efficiency 
projects, auctioning them to brokers or consumers, and using the proceeds to fund 
additional energy efficiency projects. The revenues from the ESC sales will supplement 
funds available under NYSERDA’s public benefit fund program for energy efficiency. 
Historically, the fund was known as the “Peak Load Reduction” Program; it is currently 
being redesigned and will be relaunched as the “Existing Facilities” Program. Once the 
ESC program is operational, efficiency projects installed through the NYSERDA 
programs may sell ESCs equivalent to the calculated savings. In this way, the sale of 
ESCs should increase energy efficiency implementation, both in terms of size and 
number of projects.  
 
NYSERDA plans to use the measurement and verification (M&V) system already in 
place for its existing energy efficiency program to determine the savings and number of 
ESCs issued for projects. Therefore, the ESC program will require very little additional 
cost with respect to M&V, but it is expected to be well-served by NYSERDA’s robust 
project database and rigorous established protocols. One of the stated goals of the 
program is to ensure that savings are scrutinized and determined to be real and additional. 
Savings for small projects are calculated based on deemed savings, while medium 
projects require engineering analysis; and large projects require both an engineering 
analysis and actual measurement (e.g., using data loggers).  
 
To minimize transaction costs, the number of ESCs granted to a project will be estimated 
over the expected lifetime of the efficiency measure and issued in the first year of 
operation of the measure. The savings will be discounted for free ridership (i.e., projects 
that would have been installed without the incentives provided through the program or 
may be done for nonenergy-related reasons). NYSERDA plans to develop a standard set 
of guidance on the expected lifetime of various measures based on previous experience 
with efficiency projects and technology turnover.  
 
To initiate the program, NYSERDA began aggregating ESCs from customers in the Peak 
Load Reduction Program during summer 2007. All of the participants voluntarily agreed 
to donate the environmental benefits associated with the efficiency projects to 
NYSERDA, which will enable the group to auction them as ESCs. As of May 2008, 
NYSERDA had acquired about 200,000 MWh of energy savings from roughly 800 to 
900 individual projects, mainly at commercial facilities. As of July 2008, program 
administrators were developing a full plan for the auction program, including decisions 
about ownership of the ESCs. They also were determining whether the benefits of the 
ESCs would be held in escrow and retired on behalf of ESC purchasers or whether the 
ownership of the attributes would be transferred.  
 
To address double-counting, NYSERDA plans to initially rely on attestations from 
brokers that the ESCs will not be double-sold. Eventually, tracking of ownership and 
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retirement of ESCs may be integrated into an automated REC tracking system, which is 
currently under development for New York.  
 
One of the main drivers of the program is its potential to use energy savings to reduce 
carbon emissions leakage from the RGGI cap-and-trade program. Although the program 
design does not assign carbon benefits directly to energy efficiency projects, these 
projects can provide carbon emission reductions to the extent that they can reduce 
emissions leakage. Within the competitive generation region covered by RGGI, which 
includes New York State, there is a total cap on carbon emissions from electricity 
generation. Leakage occurs when generation shifts from sources subject to RGGI caps to 
those outside the RGGI region that are not subject to the cap, which results in a potential 
net increase in carbon emissions when the uncapped plants export energy into New York 
and other RGGI states. With no cap, the power plants outside of RGGI have a 
competitive cost advantage over the plants within RGGI. NYSERDA is deriving a 
methodology of measuring the potential leakage reduction that energy efficiency projects 
could provide.  
  
There are several key features to be culled out of the NYSERDA program and potentially 
emulated by other states’ systems benefit fund administrators who want to use ESCs to 
make limited funds go further. Most important, NYSERDA is relying on its existing 
efficiency programs and infrastructure to provide a foundation for credible ESCs. It is 
leveraging the existing M&V data and protocols to minimize transaction costs and to 
streamline the process of verifying and issuing ESCs. In this way, the NYSERDA 
program is a model that could potentially be replicated by other funds that are devoted to 
implementing efficiency measures.  
 
Arguably, the NYSERDA program is not a pure voluntary ESC market in the true sense.  
Unlike a straightforward voluntary market, the supply is predetermined and pre-
aggregated. But unlike a compliance market, buyers are voluntary and demand is not 
fixed and constant. NYSERDA might perhaps be best characterized as an inversion of the 
normal compliance market model, in which regulatory mandates/goals create a supply of 
ESCs, and the market provides the demand.  Perhaps, then, this kind of model provides 
some sort of pathway to creating a true voluntary ESC market, by addressing the 
development and communication of a value proposition, defining customer classes, and 
learning about and overcoming obstacles to customer and stakeholder acceptance. At the 
same time, the NYSERDA program addresses another problem that states face: meeting 
aggressive energy savings and/or carbon reduction goals while limiting the impact on 
ratepayers. One of the appeals to the program is that it encourages private participation in 
ESC markets while addressing the concern some buyers might have about supporting 
another person or entity’s private economic benefit; at least in part, the NYSERDA 
model instead supports stretching public benefits dollars farther.  
 
Early examples of voluntary activity (see also Other Voluntary Activity: IBM) with 
ESCs suggest an emerging interest to coincide with the renewed broader interest in the 
importance of energy savings. However, for the voluntary market to build momentum, 
there is a need for an independent, national certification body. Voluntary markets also 
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can benefit from lessons learned in compliance markets, particularly with regard to M&V 
protocols and certification processes.  
 
Other Voluntary Activity: IBM  
In the private sector, IBM launched another kind of pilot program to create the market 
flexibility that ESCs can provide and help move projects forward in their clients’ energy-
intensive data centers. Because of cooling and other equipment needs, these operations 
require as much as 15 times more energy per square foot than a typical office building.  
 
In November 2007, IBM created a relationship with Neuwing Energy Ventures to help 
measure energy-reduction measures and create certificates from the reductions. The goal is 
to make the efficiency certificates program available to users of IBM’s systems and data 
storage offerings, providing clients with the option to either keep and retire the certificates or 
make them available for purchase, first in the United States and later in Europe. The 
certificates program is part of IBM’s $1 billion per year “Project Big Green” initiative, aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of IBM products as well as delivering technologies that help 
customers increase energy efficiency in their data centers and physical plants.  
 
Under the program, Neuwing first establishes an energy consumption baseline for an 
interested data center based on industry estimates for the servers and the data center’s 
energy profile. The energy decision maker for the center can then choose from several 
preidentified projects aimed at reducing electricity consumption in data centers, including the 
use of virtualization technologies to reduce the number of physical systems and methods for 
correcting design flaws. Once the measure is implemented, Neuwing creates certificates 
based on the savings (MWh) and keeps a portion of the certificates or a “per MWh-saved” fee 
in exchange for their assessment services. It is too soon to gauge the effectiveness of the IBM 
program, but its outline presents an interesting set of ideas for a very important sector of the 
energy efficiency market. 
 
Carbon Market Interaction 
Efficiency has played a substantial role in international carbon offset markets, comprising 
18% of the global voluntary carbon offset transactions in 2007 (Hamilton et al. 2008). 
Energy savings have begun to be traded as voluntary carbon offsets in the Chicago 
Climate Exchange (CCX) – a trading platform through which businesses or institutional 
entities commit to GHG emissions reductions and trade with one another to meet their 
target – and through a small number of bilateral transactions. As of this writing, there are 
six energy efficiency-based offset projects registered on the CCX out of 106 total 
registered projects. 
 
Going forward, one key to the value of ESCs in these markets will be how seamlessly 
they can be integrated, or “converted” into offsets, so that the same ESC instrument can 
participate in voluntary ESC or carbon markets. While energy savings clearly offer 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions benefits and may be a key strategy in achieving GHG 
mitigation goals, their role in carbon markets will be shaped by the design of future 
policies and, in the interim, by standards adopted for voluntary markets. Emerging 
compliance markets could be the largest opportunity for ESCs, especially in the event of 
a federal carbon cap-and-trade program, as has been proposed. 
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Direct Versus Indirect Emissions 
Besides additionality requirements, which apply to any ESC market but have been 
particularly important in carbon markets, another key issue for efficiency is that it creates 
an indirect emission benefit by reducing the need for conventional generation, compared 
with direct emission reductions, such as those achieved by installing pollution controls on 
industrial factories. Therefore, there are questions as to whether efficiency measures can 
or should be used to offset direct emissions. REC policy makers grapple with the same 
issue: RECs, which also can reduce indirect but not direct emissions, are generally 
accepted as offsets for conventional power purchases, but there is ongoing debate over 
whether they can be used to offset direct GHG emissions. 
 
The emissions reductions associated with the efficiency measure depend on the type of 
generation that is displaced (e.g., whether it is natural gas or coal). The fact that 
efficiency creates an indirect emission reduction benefit also makes it unclear whether 
efficiency can claim the property right to the emission reduction. The issue of ownership 
likely will be clarified when carbon regulations are adopted; but, in the interim, there 
continues to be debate about ownership and the extent to which sources that provide 
indirect emissions benefits can be used as offsets of direct carbon emissions, especially in 
regions where caps are expected.  
 
Carbon Cap and Trade 
Carbon regulation is indeed beginning to emerge in the United States, and the shape of 
these policies will have ramifications for how ESCs can interact in carbon markets going 
forward. When it takes effect in 2009, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
which involves 10 Northeast states, will be the first cap-and-trade program established in 
the United States. There also are two regional programs under development in the West 
and the Midwest. The Western Climate Initiative, which involves seven Western states 
and four Canadian provinces is developing rules. And finally, the Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, which involves approximately a dozen Midwestern 
states, also is developing cap-and-trade systems. A program also is being debated at the 
federal level.  
 
In the cap-and-trade programs that have been developed in the Northeast (RGGI) and in 
Europe, allowances have been provided only to direct emitters and not to indirect 
emission reduction measures such as efficiency. Thus, while efficiency provides 
emissions benefits and will make it easier to comply with the cap, efficiency measures do 
not affect overall carbon emissions because the emitters will simply use any allowances 
that are freed-up by the efficiency measures to meet the cap. While they have not been 
adopted in these programs, set-asides or other allocation measures may be used in cap- 
and-trade programs to credit indirect emissions sources that provide emissions benefits 
(such as efficiency), which would potentially enable ESCs to play in carbon markets 
(Bertoldi et al. 2005, Bird et al. 2007). Set-asides for renewables and efficiency have 
been used in some NOx cap-and-trade programs and a set-aside was recently proposed in 
federal climate legislation (Jacobson and High 2008). Load-based caps also may enable 
efficiency to participate in carbon markets (Hamrin et al. 2007). Because most U.S. cap-
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and-trade programs are in the early stages of development, it is unclear how efficiency 
measures will be treated.   
 
While the RGGI program does not specifically grant carbon emission allowances to 
efficiency measures, some argue that efficiency can still play a role in providing overall 
reductions to the extent that it prevents leakage – the idea that caps may cause power 
generation to be shifted to high-emitting plants outside of the regulated region. Leakage 
is a particular concern for regional cap-and-trade programs and, if it occurs, overall 
emission reduction targets may not be fully realized; rather, emissions may simply be 
shifted to other regions. Energy efficiency may be able to play a role in addressing 
leakage by reducing cost pressures to meet the cap. As discussed earlier, the NYSERDA 
voluntary pilot ESC program is predicated on this theory that energy efficiency will result 
in carbon emissions reductions by reducing imports into the region.   
 
 
ESC Trading in Connecticut  
For U.S. EEPS policy makers and those seeking to understand the prospects for broader 
U.S. ESC compliance trading, the ESC trading program in Connecticut merits attention; 
at the time of this writing, it is the only U.S. state with active ESC trading.11 As the 
experience of a U.S. state, lessons from Connecticut can be more applicable than 
European examples to the circumstances and challenges of other EEPS states considering 
trading.  
 
Connecticut expanded its RPS in 2005 (via Public Act 05-01,“An Act Concerning Energy 
Independence”) to include an energy efficiency portfolio standard, called “Class III,” to 
meet a 1% energy efficiency savings target for 2007, ramping up to 2% for 2008, 3% for 
2009, and 4% for 2010 and thereafter.12  
 
The targets include a broad array of eligible savings projects, including combined heat 
and power (CHP), as well as load management and demand response. The Connecticut 
Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC) serves as the certifying body, approving 
projects for Class III credit issuance on a quarterly basis. 
 
In 2007, Public Act 07-242, “An Act Concerning Electricity and Energy Efficiency,” 
expanded the eligible savings measures to include certain waste heat recovery systems. In 
September 2008, a proposed expansion of the act was drafted to encompass residential 
measures (DPUC 2008). As of this writing, discussions on that draft decision are still 
underway and a decision has not yet been made on key features, such as the cutoff date 
for residential measures, prior to which the measures will be ineligible. 
 
Obligated suppliers can purchase Class III credits to meet their obligations on a quarterly 
basis; ESCs are issued each quarter for each project over the life of the project, with a 
maximum of 10 years. To the extent that obligations are not met, suppliers must pay 3.1 
                                                 
11 As of July 2008. 
12 Each calendar year’s target must be met by January 1 of the following year. 
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cents/kWh in the form of an ACP set by the DPUC. By way of comparison, the Class I 
and II ACP (for renewables) is statutorily set at 5.5 cents/kWh. To guarantee a market for 
the credits, there is an established floor price of 1 cent/kWh for the credits. This floor 
price may become significant in the event of an over-supply of ESCs that could otherwise 
drive down the price and undermine the value of the program. 
 
Market value is a key indicator for considerations of market size. Although credit prices 
are under cover of contract, information on average or median prices is not confidential.  
One of the ESC providers in Connecticut, United Illuminating, reports an average price in 
the roughly 2-year-old market of about $20/MWh, and broker bulletin boards during the 
same period show that the ask price for ESCs has ranged from about $20-28/MWh.13 By 
contrast, prices in the Italian regime are somewhat lower; in fact, the weighted average 
price of Type 1 EEC (electricity savings) in Italy dropped from about 77 Euro/toe  (which 
equates to about $9.05/MWh) to 47.7 Euro/toe (about $5.60/MWh) over the period from 
2006 to 2007 (Pavan 2008).  
 
Context for the Connecticut ESC Program  
It is important to understand not only the rules in Connecticut, their rationale, and how 
well they are working, but also the context in which ESC trading was created in the 
state.14 Connecticut’s unique circumstances likely played a significant role in the state 
legislature’s initial decision to implement an ESC trading regime. The context also helps 
explain the reasons for the various implementation rules of the Class III Credits program 
promulgated by the Connecticut DPUC.  
 
First, Connecticut is one of the U.S. states that has been deregulated, or restructured, for 
retail electricity. So unlike several other EEPS states that are regulated and have 
generally only a few investor-owned regulated utilities responsible for most EEPS 
compliance, Connecticut has more than 20 competitive suppliers (load-serving entities, or 
LSEs) responsible for a share of EEPS compliance.15 Unlike regulated states, the large 
numbers of competitive load-serving entities are not utilities with energy efficiency 
experience administering public benefits funds. Many of them are energy marketers and 
traders who do not possess this type of experience.  
 
Conversely, the two major Connecticut distribution utilities – United Illuminating (UI) 
and Connecticut Power & Light (CL&P) – had been administering the energy efficiency 
programs paid for by public benefit funds, with DPUC oversight, since 2000 (for about 
five years prior to the enactment of the EEPS). They were positioned to continue to 
implement the vast majority of savings measures for EEPS compliance. 
                                                 
13 Indicative pricing information can be obtained from ICAP at http://www.icap.com/ and from Evolution 
Markets at http://new.evomarkets.com/.  
14 Some background may also be helpful context for the Connecticut program. Because of state budget 
problems in 2003, the Connecticut state legislature took over part of the fund through a bond issue. The 
fund became partly securitized, and a little more than 25% of the ratepayer charge normally used to fund 
energy savings projects was used, for a time, to pay off the debt.  
15 WattsNewCT. “Suppliers and Aggregators.” Electric Restructuring. 
http://www.wattsnewct.com/newsuppliers.html.  Accessed August 21, 2008. 
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Although the various suppliers are free to fund and implement their own energy savings 
activities for EEPS compliance (see Figure 3), to date they primarily have opted to buy 
ESCs from those issued through the Conservation and Load Management (C&LM) fund 
administered by UI and CL&P. UI and CL&P do not have their own Class III obligations 
under the Connecticut restructuring rules, but they are the largest sellers of Class III 
credits in the state by far. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Connecticut DPUC 
Figure 3. The flow of ESCs in the Connecticut Compliance Trading Scheme16 
 
                                                 
16 State of Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control. Docket No. 05-07-19, DPUC Proceeding to 
Develop A New Distributed Resources Portfolio Standard (Class III), February 16, 2006. 
http://www.ct.gov/dpuc/cwp/view.asp?a=3354&q=415186  
 30
Trading Experience 
For the most part, the Connecticut ESC market mechanism is working as intended: The 
independent suppliers are complying with the EEPS policy with their most cost-effective 
option, which is buying credits (ESCs), primarily from UI and CL&P, the two major 
investor-owned distribution utilities without Class III obligations of their own. Credits 
derived from C&LM-funded projects, administered by the two utilities, comprise the 
lion’s share of the market. 17 These credits are sold to the suppliers through the quarterly 
auctions.18  
 
So the effect of the Class III program generally has been that those entities in the best 
position to implement Connecticut energy savings programs – CL&P and UI – are doing 
so. At the same time, other suppliers are meeting their obligations by buying the credits, 
the proceeds of which circle back to support the C&LM fund to feed future projects and 
optimizing the state’s ability to meet its targets. The credits sold by the distribution 
utilities on behalf of Connecticut’s electric ratepayers return dollars to the funding 
stream. 
 
Table 4 shows the New England Generation Information System (NEPOOL GIS) trading 
volume summary for a recent quarter. Because the system was already functioning prior 
to the Connecticut trading scheme’s implementation, Connecticut’s choice to “piggy-
back” on to the NEPOOL GIS energy generation tracking system was a key leverage 
point in the state’s efforts to reduce transaction costs. Connecticut parties can use the 
NEPOOL GIS to track, trade, and settle Class III Credits online at www.nepoolgis.com. 
The data in the table, accessed in September 2008, showed about 77,000 Class III credits, 
all of which were derived from the C&LM fund.19 Each credit denotes 1 MWh of energy 
savings.  
                                                 
17 This is the case regardless of whether measured in MWh, number of projects, or number of energy 
savings measures. 
18 Bruno, Steve. CL&P. Personal Communication. August 4, 2008. Mascola, Fred. UI. Personal 
Communication. July 31, 2008. 
19 https://www.nepoolgis.com/myModule/rpt/myrpt.asp?r=107&TabName=Certificate. This quantity 
should not be construed as the full amount available for that quarter, simply the amount listed as traded. 
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Table 4. Example of NEPOOL GIS Trading Activity 
Fuel 
Number of 
Certificates 
Traded 
Solar photovoltaic 762
Fuel cell 3,227
Digester gas 9,096
Efficient resource (Maine) 50,934
CLM 76,743
Wind 181,798
Landfill gas 252,799
Biomass 320,371
Municipal solid waste 340,409
Wood 489,610
Trash-to-energy 532,365
Jet 547,315
Diesel 813,650
Oil 1,093,789
Hydroelectric/hydropower 2,526,166
Coal 4,912,296
Natural gas 8,745,525
Nuclear 9,608,300
Total 30,505,155
 
 
Source: NEPOOL GIS, https://www.nepoolgis.com/myModule/rpt/myrpt.asp?r=107&TabName=Certificate. 
Note: Emphasis added.  
 
 
The total Connecticut Class III requirement for calendar year 2008 – enough to cover 2% 
of retail sales – is about 627,000 MWh. The available information on approximate 
eligible quantities of these credits derived from the C&LM for both 2007 and 2008 is in 
Table 5.  
 
Table 5. C&LM Class III Credits Available from CL&P and UI (MWh) 
 2007 2008 
CL&P Residential Savings 178,500 257,500 
CL&P Commercial and Industrial 
Savings 
368,000 483,000 
UI Total Savings 98,000 110,000 
Expected Available from CL&P 
and UI, Combined 
644,500 850,500 
Expected Total State Obligation 300,000 627,000 
 
Sources: CL&P, UI, and the 2009 C&LM Plan submitted jointly by the two companies. 
Note: All data points are rounded approximations. 
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Program Structure and Lessons Learned 
Several of the structural elements in the Connecticut trading scheme support a reduction 
in the utilities’ administrative burden and transaction costs. For the first 18 months of the 
program, the emphasis was on streamlining the way that ESCs were issued and traded for 
compliance, keeping it simple with the idea that the program could be expanded later. In 
July 2008, about six quarters into the compliance period for the EEPS, some of these 
simple rules are being revisited.  
 
There are several examples demonstrating this approach toward establishing clear, simple 
rules meant to keep the difficulty of compliance, administrative burdens, and transaction 
costs to a minimum.20 Perhaps the most important example is one of good fortune as 
much as good planning. The DPUC was able to work with NEPOOL, APX, and other 
pertinent stakeholders to piggyback the tracking of credit ownership through the GIS, an 
automated system that was already in existence for tracking RECs in New England. The 
GIS tracks parties’ transfer of credit ownership, establishing a traceable record of the 
chain of ownership for the Class III credits. The paper-free Web-based platform allows 
these tasks to be accomplished at a low cost.  
 
Another example of a rule that helps ease the administrative burden is that the two major 
utilities – which together administer the fund that creates the vast majority of the credits – 
do not need to receive DPUC approval for every project’s M&V. Rather, they each 
submit an annual “blanket” plan for all of the expected efficiency projects, with M&V 
incorporated into that plan. The DPUC approves the entire plan at once, and then the 
utilities enter data into the GIS accordingly, so that credits are created quarterly as they 
are actually generated. The utilities also report on the generation of REC credits and sales 
on a quarterly basis to the DPUC. But there is no need for quarterly M&V approval, 
because that is covered through the annual process.21   
 
Ironing Out Residential Rules 
Residential projects typically require aggregation and a deemed savings measurement 
approach; large commercial and industrial measures are easier to measure and track. That 
is the strong rationale for excluding residential measures in the initial period, a takeaway 
for other states to consider. But once about 18 months of market experience was 
complete, the DPUC included residential measures in the Class III eligibility. 
 
Still another example of simplifying Class III trading is that the DPUC also established a 
kind of one-size-fits-all approach to ownership of the proceeds of sold credits. Rather 
than attempting to work a split in proceeds for C&LM-funded projects, 100% of those 
proceeds went back into the C&LM fund. Similarly, the way the rules are currently 
structured, 100% of proceeds from independently funded projects go to the source of that 
funding. The 100% rule (in both its forms) is one of the rules being revisited.  
                                                 
20 Even with the DPUC rules established to simplify compliance, inevitable challenges have arisen. For 
example, there have been obligated parties that missed opportunities to buy Class III certificates because, in 
some cases, they were not aware of the existence of the auctions within the time frame they were occurring.  
21 The utilities’ M&V plan is called the “Program Savings Document.”  
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Because energy end users typically fund part of the cost of C&LM-funded energy savings 
projects on their own sites, the DPUC reviewed the possibility of returning 25% of the 
proceeds to the end user.22 This was the arrangement that the statute directed, reviewed 
by the DPUC in August 2008 as part of its rules promulgation for residential measures’ 
inclusion.23 In the conception of the 75/25 split, there was deference to the value of not 
overcomplicating such a split by attempting anything more complicated than a 75/25 
proceeds split for every C&LM project. There has been no attempt, for example, to 
introduce different proceeds split formulas for different projects types.  
 
But the DPUC ultimately determined that even the 75/25 split could introduce a new 
administrative burden, in that it could require the CL&P and UI to backtrack their pool of 
Class III credits to the customers participating. This was a significant concern for 
program administrators at UI and CP&L, because the legislation technically allows the 
DPUC to structure the return of proceeds from ESC sales in a way that would be tough to 
administer. For example, if customers purchased lighting fixtures, the utilities would not 
want to be in the position of reimbursing that customer for 25% of the ESC proceeds on a 
quarterly or even annual basis over the lifetime of the savings measure.  
 
With the aim of not adding such administrative layers to the running of the Class III 
program, the utilities took the position that a good compromise might be to return the 
25% to the ratepayers at large. This would avoid the need to track up to 10 years’ worth 
of credits to the specific customers on whose sites the measures were implemented, 
which the utilities view as too difficult and time-consuming. They proposed instead to 
simply reimburse all ratepayers by adding the reimbursement into federally mandated 
congestion charges in the customer bill. This would give deference to the fact that 
customers are paying for some portion of the savings measures, without adding the 
burdensome responsibility of trying to track proceeds back to individual projects.  
 
Ultimately, the DPUC decided to allocate 100% of Class III credits to the C&LM 
program, allocated to residential programs, “as a means to continue to fund the benefits 
that residential customers receive from the C&LM-funded residential programs.” They 
decided against what the distribution utilities referred to as “a plethora of administrative 
headaches associated with allocating 25% of Class III credits to residential customers” on 
to the program administrators. Important for program designers in other states, the DPUC 
cited the small energy savings accrued per customer and the many thousands of 
customers to track, the transient nature of some customers, and split benefits in rental 
properties. The DPUC concluded that allocating the 25% Class III credit on a per-
customer basis was “plainly infeasible.” They directed the distribution utilities to report 
their residential allocations in their annual C&LM filing submitted to the DPUC.  In the 
same proceeding of September 2008, they further directed that market participants who 
participate in C&LM programs and who aggregate more than 100 kW of residential load 
                                                 
22 For example, if the C&LM funds an equipment upgrade, the customer would typically buy the equipment 
and be reimbursed fully for the additional incremental expenditure for buying more expensive energy-
efficient equipment.  
23 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-243t(c) 
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may receive 25% of the Class III credit allocation. Lastly, they directed that 
independently funded residential projects will receive 100% of the value of the Class III 
RECs generated by the projects.   
 
Other Notable Provisions 
At least two of the Connecticut rules are somewhat unusual and particularly worth 
watching over time to note how they affect the success of the program; after only four 
auctions to date, it is still too early to say. The most important is the inclusion of CHP 
projects. Every MWh generated at a CHP plant that came online after January 1, 2006, 
with an overall efficiency level of at least 50% and with useful electrical energy that is at 
least 20% of the total output qualifies. Because the plants will generate large quantities of 
eligible credits, some stakeholders have anticipated that the inclusion of CHP will make 
the targets too easy to attain and result in fewer non-CHP efficiency projects, because 
CHP is likely to be the most cost-competitive way to meet the requirements. Some of the 
CHP projects may not have been built as a direct result of the EEPS but may be receiving 
an extra benefit from its subsequent implementation.  
 
For example, at least one eligible plant at a paper mill has a capacity of about 30 MW, 
meaning it will likely generate more than 175,000 MWh per year, or more than 25% of 
the credits required for the entire 2008 overall Connecticut obligation. The ability to trade 
credits makes all of those credits eligible and will likely keep the price for credits down. 
Many expect that the CHP rule, in particular, will cause an oversupply of credits by the 
time the requirement flattens out at 4% in 2010 for each year after that, creating 
downward price pressure. But many RPS requirements around the country have been 
revisited and increased over time for similar reasons; that is the expectation of some in 
the Connecticut Class III situation as well.  
 
The other legislative rule worth noting and tracking is the establishment of a floor price 
of $0.01/kWh for the credits, limiting the open-bidding process. The price protection 
seems designed to ensure that the risk of oversupply does not degrade the value of the 
credits and hurt the long-term health of the market, a stop-gap measure to help keep the 
market stable if the targets turn out to be low, especially considering the availability of 
CHP credits. But the floor also can have the effect of limiting the free market’s ability to 
fully incentivize less-expensive projects and reward them for their ability to deliver 
credits less expensively. In the early auction periods, the two utility sellers have reported 
that they have already experienced an oversupply; this also may be because, at the early 
stages of market development, obligated suppliers may not have been aware of the 
auction periods and credit availability. Banking rules have allowed the sellers to sell 
some of the same credits in subsequent auctions.  
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Key Structural Elements of ESCs Programs 
Experience with domestic REC markets and ESC markets abroad have helped distill the 
elements of the required foundation for ESC trading, to be managed by the appropriate 
PUC or other certifying body. Early examples in Europe have demonstrated that, when 
administered effectively, ESCs can be an effective complement to existing structures 
promoting efficiency.  
 
Although this analysis focuses on the compliance side, where there has been more 
activity, most of the key considerations that must be addressed in a compliance ESC 
program apply to voluntary markets as well. Many considerations lead to decision points 
for which there is no clearly demonstrated “correct” policy feature, at least none that has 
emerged in market development to date. More often, conflicting values must be balanced 
and solutions are a “work-in-progress.” The most fundamental balance of interests is the 
need to create verification procedures that ensure credibility while controlling transaction 
costs.   
 
With these caveats in mind, an effective ESC trading platform for EEPS compliance – 
one that instills long-term public and stakeholder confidence – will depend largely on the 
following key considerations or features (Hamrin et al. 2007):  
 
• Real, measurable, verified savings that take into account the following issues: 
o credible certifying body 
o additionality test that ensures measure is beyond business as usual (BAU) 
o rigorous measurement and verification (M&V) based on established 
protocols 
o length of period for which ESCs are issued and up-front ESC issuance 
where appropriate 
o alternative compliance payments  
o close scrutiny of double-counting through an established system of 
tracking and/or certificate/credit attestation process. 
o careful handling of free-rider issue 
o rules for banking  
• Streamlined ownership reporting and tracking system to hold down costs 
• Provisions for third-party trading, opening the market beyond obligated entities 
• Long-term integration with REC and carbon emission reduction markets where 
feasible and sensible 
• Transparency in rules and transactional information 
• Early planning for inter-market, interregional, and international trading 
• Providing for ESC ownership in a manner that is fair to both facilities investing in 
energy savings and organizations providing energy saving services. For example, 
the installer of high efficiency equipment could give a discount to end users 
paying for the installation, in exchange for ESC ownership (Bertoldi 2008).  
 
Although values underlying their respective rules are generally shared among the existing 
ESC trading programs, rules for many of these aspects differ among the countries with 
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established ESC trading. This analysis addresses each of these features individually in 
terms of their treatment within those international energy efficiency obligation schemes 
where trading of ESCs has occurred – Italy, the UK, France, and New South Wales, 
Australia.   
 
In addition, the European Commission (EC) has stated an intention to implement ESCs at 
the European level. The Association of Issuing Bodies, whose mission is to harmonize 
international energy certificate schemes, has expanded its focus from green certificates 
(RECs) to also include ESCs.24 The EC and other stakeholders are considering a possible 
mandatory international scheme that would include ESC trading (Bertoldi 2008). They 
are carefully weighing the equities of such a continent-wide, or even global, trading 
scheme, most notably how to handle the difficult situation of parties in one country 
financing projects in another country and the potential such a situation has for weakening 
national policies or creating unfair burdens or benefits. This is analogous to the issues 
from one U.S. state to another that would be inherent in a U.S. federal policy. Also, an 
international ESC compliance market would have to dovetail with existing European 
carbon markets.  
The British scheme, in particular, is a case study in policy features that tend to reduce 
market size for ESCs. Only a handful of trades have occurred in the British scheme – less 
than 10 trades combined during the three compliance years of the market (Mundaca et al. 
2008). A number of factors cause the low volumes. These include an excess in the 
available supply of savings (driven also by a high cost-effective potential in the insulation 
segment and certainty about the penalty in case of noncompliance), a limited number of 
eligible parties, and perceived transaction costs (related to contract negotiation and 
liability risks). The banking option in the UK also resulted in fewer trades, as parties have 
increased their own activity level to use savings for future commitment periods. Lastly, 
the number of eligible parties has been restricted because only obligated parties are 
allowed to trade, reducing liquidity. This is crucial because large differences in saving 
costs among parties are also necessary to trigger trading. Obligated parties also thought 
that trading activity could involve high negotiation costs, as strategically sensitive 
information could be disclosed to a buyer/seller. Each of these factors is an object lesson 
for U.S. policy designers.  
Eligible Project Types 
EEPS programs differ significantly in how broad they define project eligibility, and they 
are not always consistent. In some cases, ESCs may be derived from projects that save 
energy by making use of thermal waste or another byproduct, such as combined heat and 
power (CHP). Certain project types, such as solar hot water systems and geothermal heat 
pumps, may be treated as renewable energy by one program and as efficiency in another.  
 
One of the concerns that has been expressed about the Connecticut program is that there 
is such an abundance of CHP, in terms of MWh generated, that its inclusion as an eligible 
resource may make EEPS obligations deceptively easy to meet. The Connecticut program 
is still too new to make an accurate assessment of this anticipated issue, but the criticism 
                                                 
24 See http://www.aib-net.org/portal/page/portal/AIB_HOME.  
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underscores the importance of designing a policy for which project eligibility is 
determined in close conjunction with target stringency. The UK also grants ESCs for 
CHP projects. 
 
There are many different technology types from which ESCs may be derived, but they 
are generally no different than projects eligible for an EEPS, from which there are no 
derived certificates. The exception is that some compliance programs limit the types of 
eligible projects to keep measurement and verification more streamlined. The other 
significant distinction among EEPS programs generally is that they don’t all include gas 
efficiency measures. 
 
Projects generally exist within three general overlapping categories: upgrades and 
retrofits, heating or cooling measures, and load management. ESCs derived from energy 
savings through reduced electricity consumption may be derived from many different 
project types. All of the programs grant ESCs for energy-efficient lighting; equipment 
and appliance upgrades and retrofits, such as those for boilers, motors, and air 
conditioners; and insulation or other heating or cooling measures, such as HVAC system 
upgrades, ground source heat pumps, or solar water heating. Some measures also may 
qualify as renewable energy projects, depending on how they are categorized (Hamrin et 
al. 2007).  
 
The five programs that feature active trading expand somewhat from this basic list, but 
none more than Italy in terms of project diversity. In some cases, EEPS and ESC regimes 
also may include demand-response or load-management measures that shift electricity 
load from peak to off-peak hours. Eligible project types and practices are listed in  
Table 6. These could include smart metering, sensors to anticipate heating or cooling, or 
remote monitoring and control of various energy-intensive applications.  
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Table 6. ESC Schemes and Eligible Project Types 
ESC Program, Year 
Effective 
Eligible Technology Types and 
Practices 
Major Stipulations 
Connecticut, 2007 • CHP plants 
• Demand response 
• Load management 
• Electricity suppliers must 
meet a percentage of  their 
total supply in energy 
efficiency and CHP25 
France, 2006 • Double glazing of windows 
• Heating controls 
• Insulation 
• Lighting  
• Variable speed motors 
• Wood-firing heating systems 
• Favors standardized 
measures with set energy 
savings; customized or less-
common projects are 
assessed case-by-case. 
Italy, 2005 • Bio-climatic architecture 
• Control of radiation entering through 
windows 
• Electricity in thermal uses 
• Heating/cooling and heat recovery 
with nonrenewable energy 
• On-site renewable energy 
• Passive cooling 
• Promotion of electric and natural gas 
vehicles 
• Reduction of air-conditioning 
electricity consumption 
• Reduction of passive-draw power 
• Solar water heating 
• Substitution of electricity to other 
sources 
• Half of the goal set for each 
year must be obtained by 
reductions in the 
consumption of electricity 
and gas by end-users 
New South Wales, 
Australia, 2003 
• Demand-side abatement 
• Energy efficiency projects reduce or 
replace energy consuming equipment 
or processes 
• Forest sequestration of carbon 
• Fuel switching with reduced GHG 
emissions 
• New energy efficient equipment 
• On-site electricity generation with 
reduced GHG emissions 
• Reduction of GHG emissions by  
non-electricity sector industries1 
• Required “benchmark 
participants” (i.e., major 
electricity producers) must 
meet a percentage of the 
total benchmark GHG 
emissions reductions relative 
to their contribution to the 
grid. 
United Kingdom, 2002 • CHP plants 
• Fuel-switching programs 
• High efficiency hot water tanks 
• Window glazing 
 
• Half of the savings generated 
for compliance must be 
derived from low- or 
moderate-income family 
home 
 
 
 
                                                 
25See also Hamrin et al. 2007.  
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Italy grants ESCs for the broadest of project types within three general categories: 
electricity, natural gas, or fuel switching combined with energy efficiency (Hamrin et al. 
2007). In Italy, at least half of the target set for each year has to be achieved via a 
reduction of electricity and gas end uses (known as the “50% constraint”); the rest can be 
achieved via primary energy savings in other sectors (Bertoldi et al. 2005).  
 
The other ESC programs grant ESCs for a somewhat smaller range of project types 
compared to Italy (Hamrin et al. 2007). Besides the standard project types, the UK also 
grants ESCs for high efficiency hot water tanks, window glazing, and for fuel-switching 
programs. Both the UK and Connecticut issue ESCs for CHP plants. France issues ESCs 
for wood-fired heating systems, in addition to the standard list. Some regimes exclude or 
develop requirements around entire classes of projects. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, at least half of the savings generated for compliance must be derived from 
low- or moderate-income family homes. In France, standardized measures with stipulated 
energy savings are generally favored, whereas customized or less-common projects are 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Eligible technologies in France include lighting, 
insulation, double glazing of windows, heating controls, variable speed motors, and 
wood-fired heating systems (Hamrin et al. 2007). 
 
Ultimately, behavioral changes also could be included in qualifying project types. In an 
age of sophisticated Web-based remote-monitoring equipment, rewarding the installation 
of such equipment through ESC incentives makes sense. For example, ESCs could be 
created when users switch off energy-intensive equipment during peak time-of-use 
periods, decrease or increase the set temperature point of their heating or cooling 
systems, or decrease the size of their equipment (Bertoldi and Huld 2006). 
 
Targets 
For the five active EEPS schemes – Connecticut and the four nondomestic programs – a 
fundamental question with respect to ESCs is whether the target is stringent enough to 
necessitate trading. If targets are easily achieved, introducing trading may offer little or 
no benefit (Loper et al. 2008). Alternatively, the introduction of trading may enable 
targets to be increased over time. Because the programs considered here are still 
relatively new, it will take at least a few more years before definitive conclusions can be 
drawn as to the effect on overall energy savings that trading can provide.  
 
However, the ESC trading program in Connecticut does provide an early indication of the 
significance of ESC trading. As of mid-2008, the Connecticut C&LM fund was 
approximately $70 million, while the total value of the ESCs auctioned from the fund in 
2008 was estimated at about $3.3 million, or a little less than 5% of the total fund. 
Therefore, revenues from ESC trading likely will be sufficient to stimulate a reasonable 
fraction of new projects. Further conclusions about the efficacy of the ESCs in 
Connecticut are too difficult to draw at this early stage, approximately 18 months into 
compliance. It is, for example, too difficult to say whether ESCs will make a significant 
difference in the ability of obligated suppliers to comply with the Connecticut EEPS, 
should they reach a point where the target levels are challenging to reach. 
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EEPS targets are usually (but not always) expressed as a percentage of retail electricity 
sales. The Italian targets are expressed in terms of energy intensity, defined as energy use 
relative to gross domestic product, with a goal to reach reductions of 2% in energy 
intensity per year until 2015 and 2.5% each year after until 2030. Gas and electric 
distribution companies with more than 100,000 retail customers have energy savings 
targets that ramp up over the five-year period of 2005-09 to a potential total of an 
estimated 14 terrawatt hours (TWh) for electricity and 3.3 billion cubic meters for natural 
gas, for a total of about 5.8 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) (Hamrin et al. 2007). In 
the first year of ESC trading (2006), trading exceeded the annual target of about 86 GWh; 
thus, the target was easily met. France has the unusual rule of no annual compliance 
requirement; its three-year compliance period of July 2006-09 has only one deadline, at 
the end of that three-year period. In virtually all regimes, the extent of a given party’s 
obligation depends on that party’s share of retail energy sales. The other national targets 
may be found in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Targets for European and Australian Trading Schemes  
 Total Target for 
Period Duration 
% of Annual Demand Period  
Italy 230 petajoules 0.5% 2005-09 
France 194 petajoules 1.0% 2006-08 
United Kingdom 468 petajoules 1.0% 2005-08 
New South Wales 5% reduction in per 
capital GHG 
emissions 
N/A 2003-20 
Source: (Hamrin et al. 2007) 
Note: One petajoule is equivalent to 100,000 MWh. 
 
Certifying ody B
Given the innovative nature of ESCs, it is critical to the long-term health of the markets 
that a credible, established organization certifies ESCs. This is necessary for both 
compliance and voluntary markets to function effectively. To ensure the credibility of 
ESCs, it is important to have an independent entity that establishes the M&V 
methodologies and qualifications for parties conducting the M&V, and ensures that the 
procedures were followed and that the ESC conforms to the established trading rules. 
Generally, national trading programs employ governmental, quasi-governmental, or 
established nonprofits to certify that ESCs are what they purport to be. For example, in 
Italy, the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas certifies the ESCs.  
 
In the United Kingdom, where the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) policy was 
established in 2001 and runs in three-year cycles from 2002-11, the program is 
administered by the federal government’s Office of Gas and Electric Markets, which 
periodically audits suppliers’ savings claims through sampling and other methods. The 
compliance rules, however, were developed separately by the Department for 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs. Although suppliers often contract with third 
parties in the United Kingdom to implement savings projects, they cannot trade ESCs 
with third parties. Suppliers are allowed to trade among themselves, but only with 
advance written agreement from regulators. In France, the Ministry of Industry issues 
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certificates and administers the program. The French Agency for Environment and 
Energy Management and other industry groups define acceptable project types. In 
Connecticut, the public utility commission acts as the certifier, although the M&V 
protocols were established by the existing C&LM fund (the public benefits fund).  
 
Additionality, Free Ridership, and Cream Skimming 
All of the ESC programs seek to require some “additionality” threshold, i.e., a 
requirement that the projects only qualify if they go beyond what would have happened 
absent the ESC program, usually referred to as beyond “business as usual” (BAU). 
Additionality standards address free ridership, seeking enough rigor in excluding free 
riders or accounting for their presence, to bring credibility to the program. At the same 
time, regimes also may seek to serve the competing value of rewarding early action. For 
example, in Italy (where compliance targets took effect in 2005), projects developed in 
the preceding four-year period are still considered “additional” under their definition and 
therefore eligible for compliance in subsequent years to reward the early action. 
Interestingly, the French definition of additionality depends on whether the entity 
implementing the savings measure is obligated under the compliance target. As long as 
the technology type is eligible, any project implemented by an obligated party is 
considered additional, presumably as an incentive for obligated parties to implement their 
own measures. Non-obligated parties only meet the additionality threshold if the measure 
is not related to the entity’s main activity – that is, energy efficiency companies and 
ESCOs are precluded. 
 
Trading Rules: Obligated Entities and Parties Eligible to Trade 
For ESC implementation, a key issue is determining which parties are obligated under 
compliance regimes, as well as which parties should be eligible to participate in trading. 
Theoretically, the more parties eligible to participate, the more likely it is to increase the 
base of efficiency projects and decrease prices. However, involving a larger number of 
parities adds some administrative complexity and can pose challenges for ensuring that 
M&V protocols are followed. Widening participation also might increase the chances of 
introducing nonadditional efficiency projects, other than those that might have occurred 
otherwise (Loper et al. 2008).  
 
The Italian program, effective in January 2005, requires compliance from gas and electric 
distribution companies that had more than 100,000 customers in 2001. The rules in Italy 
allow energy service companies (ESCOs) to earn credits and sell them to the distribution 
companies, which can use the acquired ESCs (in conjunction with those from their own 
efficiency measures) to meet their EEPS obligations (Hamrin et al. 2007). The 
distribution utilities also are allowed to trade with one another and are also allowed to 
operate efficiency programs in partnership with ESCOs. Italy has an open policy on 
participation in the energy savings compliance market. Market sessions are held regularly 
and parties may sell only ESCs that are registered in their account in the ESC registry 
overseen by the Regulatory Authority. 
 
In contrast to Italy, in France, the UK, and Connecticut, retail suppliers and not 
distribution companies are obligated (Bertoldi 2008). Determining which parties should 
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be obligated is partly an issue of cost recovery: normally, distribution companies and 
their tariffs are regulated. For them, a wires charge can be used to pay the costs they incur 
to implement ESCs up to their saving target (either a fixed-cost recovery as in Italy or 
based on the cost of the ESC). Retailers are usually outside the regulated tariffs, so are 
free to charge their customers for the energy efficiency projects (Bertoldi 2008). 
 
In the UK, where retail electricity markets are deregulated, suppliers sometimes contract 
with third parties to deliver energy savings, and must report their savings quarterly to the 
Office of Gas and Electric Markets, which verifies the savings. In the UK, only suppliers 
with at least 50,000 customers are obligated; this limits the effect of the obligation on 
new entrants to the market (Bertolodi et al. 2005).  
 
In France, the obligated parties include electricity, natural gas, domestic fuel, and heating 
and cooling suppliers, but not smaller suppliers of less than 400 GWh per year in energy 
sales (Hamrin et al. 2007). Companies whose core business is energy efficiency are not 
permitted to trade, because the rules are structured to define their implemented measures 
as “nonadditional” because they are in the business of implementing such measures.  
 
Measurement and Verification 
Each ESC trading program develops its own protocols for M&V. They often use 
established templates, such as the International Performance Measurement and 
Verification Protocol, as a guide. Focused on commercial and industrial applications, the 
IPMVP covers a broad range of measures, including fuel savings, water efficiency, load 
shifting, and equipment upgrades. Others rely on existing protocols that already have 
been developed for public benefits funds that support efficiency measures. At this very 
early stage, with only a few ESC markets established, it will be useful for policy makers 
to use such guides and existing protocols. Consistency among trading regimes as they 
form will ease and, in some cases, even make possible interregional and international 
ESC trading. This could become crucial in later stages of market development, especially 
if ESCs become part of global GHG markets. 
 
M&V can be one of the most complex and expensive elements of ESC trading. As REC 
markets have amply demonstrated, public scrutiny of the credibility, integrity, and 
transparency of markets that allow trading can be greater than compliance regimes that 
do not. In addition to the methods for individual project measurement and verification, 
ESC programs also generally require licensed engineering contractors to conduct the 
work or independently verify the savings.  In addition, for the integrity of a trading 
program, projects should generate ESCs only for the period they are actually generating 
the savings, which varies depending on project type and other variables. Measured 
lifetimes are generally stipulated for classes of measures, based on previously conducted 
measure retention studies.  
 
Because ESC trading can carry additional costs to an EEPS compliance program, it is 
particularly important for policy makers considering the implementation of ESC trading 
to find streamlined, cost-saving approaches. These include M&V methods that are 
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practical yet established ways to acquire accurate estimated savings data at lower-cost 
points: computer-based simulation and deemed savings.  
 
The most accurate methods for determining savings involve measuring end-use 
consumption and then imputing savings based on a projection of baseline energy use, or 
conducting whole building measurement. End-use measurement can be conducted on 
either a project-specific basis or for samples of similar projects. In the former case, 
measurements are made by installing data loggers on project submeters or circuitry to 
measure consumption, or using other field measurement methods to make accurate 
assessments of savings associated with the specific measure. These are generally also the 
most expensive and are not always feasible at any cost. An example of field measurement 
is isolating energy retrofits from the rest of a building to gauge the savings attributable to 
the retrofit. End-use M&V can entail different levels of accuracy and expense, depending 
on what parameters are monitored instead of spot-measured, the accuracy of the 
instrumentation, and the duration of the monitoring period.   
 
But because of the expense involved, gathering actual end-use consumption data is 
practical only for the largest savings measures, where key parameters such as how many 
hours a large HVAC system is used can change results markedly. Measurement options 
that incorporate both actual and stipulated data, such as partially measured retrofit 
isolation, involve field measurement of savings combined with certain stipulated 
parameters and can present hybrid compromise between the accuracy of actual data and 
the savings in estimating data (Bertoldi and Huld 2004). Another method for measuring 
savings is known as the whole-buildings approach, for which the collective savings of a 
series of measures within a structure are inferred from the energy savings from one or 
more measures, based on the change in energy use at the building level or on utility 
billing data.  
 
Computer-based simulation determines savings through software designed to predict 
energy use and demand patterns that match actual use (Bertoldi and Huld 2006). Deemed 
savings methods use historical or so called “ex-ante” data (predetermined from previous 
similar projects or established engineering methods), to make assumptions about the 
savings a given project will create. They may incorporate assumptions or default factors 
for free ridership and for the persistence of energy savings, or how long they will last 
(Vine and Hamrin 2008). The method works particularly well for established 
technologies for which data tends to be more reliable, such as lighting measures. The 
deemed savings method is being used by NYSERDA in their pilot program and is relied 
on heavily in the Italian program as well.  
 
Italy also has used preliminary engineering calculations to preapprove projects with more 
innovative technologies for which historical data is not available (Hamrin et al. 2007). 
For savings to be additional under the Italian definition, they must exceed market trends 
and legislative requirements (Hamrin et al. 2007). Italy uses engineering estimates and 
“standard savings factors” for natural gas decompression, certain variable speed drives, 
CHP, and district heating. For other projects in the Italian program, energy monitoring 
 44
methods are used to take a “before and after” energy picture, after which variables such 
as weather and occupancy levels are factored in. 
 
In the United Kingdom, deemed savings (based on previous measurements and 
engineering methodologies) is the predominant M&V approach. Preapproved savings 
estimates are also weighted for fuel type and discounted using a discount factor of 3.5% 
over the lifetime of the measure. For projects relying on government funding, savings are 
further discounted, as a policy preference to maximize private funding. For several 
project types, savings may be based on monitoring of a valid project sample. The 
demonstration of additionality is also a function of project type. Deemed savings in 
France are based on “fast and straightforward user-friendly procedures” stemming from 
sampling or engineering calculations (Hamrin et al. 2007). 
 
Deemed savings can be particularly useful where ESC programs have access to historical 
data from efficiency measures implemented within a systems benefit program over the 
course of several years. Sampling involves using measured savings from a statistically 
valid sample of similar projects to draw conclusions about other similar projects, rather 
than evaluating each project separately. Connecticut has a detailed “Technical Reference 
Manual” with deemed savings values, engineering methodologies, and related data for all 
of the allowable technology types eligible for Class III certificates, more than 50 in the 
approximately 250-page document. Similarly, the UK uses a “Technical Guidance 
Manual” for deemed savings for established technology types.  
 
Because of the many variables involved in measuring savings, some have suggested that 
the certificates represent savings over several years, rather than a single year, the 
approach taken by NYSERDA. The advantage is that the longer time period can result in 
“smoothing out” variations such as those caused by weather (Bertoldi and Huld 2004). In 
addition, it can be easier to administer, because ESCs can be issued up front for the 
lifetime of the savings, meaning that certification only needs to occur once. However, if 
this approach is taken, some form of discounting the savings also may be appropriate to 
account for any risk that actual savings do not occur.  
 
ESC M&V protocols have the double challenge of establishing accurate baselines, or 
reference scenarios – the “before” picture for an energy savings measure and its 
forecasted energy use absent the savings measure to determine savings. The baseline is 
important to establish that the measure resulted in savings beyond business as usual. 
Different M&V methodologies have their own guidelines for establishing baselines. For 
example, a deemed savings approach imputes baselines, eliminating the need to project 
baseline energy use. For commercial and industrial retrofits, baselines are informed by 
the equipment installed at the customer’s site before the retrofit.26   
 
Reporting and Tracking Requirements 
Generally, the ability to use an automated Web-based ESC tracking program is important 
for controlling ESC program administrative costs. Such tracking systems streamline 
                                                 
26 If the original equipment was below minimum efficiency standards, the baseline will often be set at the 
standard level to avoid paying someone just to come up to code. 
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registration, chain of custody, and can minimize the risk of double-counting.  The use of 
an automated system can ensure each ESC is identified by a unique serial number that 
need not be identified manually. Automated, Web-based tracking systems can help the 
certification process by efficiently generating the necessary reports for certifying bodies. 
 
The parameters and requirements for ESC-tracking software already exist and need only 
be licensed by governments or other bodies for further development specific to their 
needs. In spring 2008, APX established the North American Renewables Registry, which 
is specifically designed partly to track ESC ownership and deal with issues such as M&V 
that are specific to ESCs. In some cases, similar to that of Connecticut, an existing REC 
registry (the NEPOOL GIS system) with similar functionality to that required by ESC 
markets can be used. In Italy, the Regulatory Authority runs a separate ESC registry and 
charges annual and transaction fees (Hamrin et al. 2007). 
 
In Italy, the certifying body, such as the PUC or other regulating body, normally oversees 
the method of tracking and verifying ESC ownership. Ideally, however, there is 
independent oversight, so that regulating and rule-making as well as the processes of 
issuing, tracking, and certifying ESCs are not all in the hands of the same organization.  
 
In Italy, there is a separate market operator that issues and registers ESCs at the request 
and oversight of the certifying body, the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas 
(Hamrin et al. 2007). But the two organizations are independent of one another. In 
Connecticut, the DPUC reviews an annual blanket plan (incorporating an M&V plan) 
submitted by each of the two utilities administering the C&LM fund. Other independent 
energy savings companies and energy savings project implementers in Connecticut must 
apply separately, on a project-specific basis, with the DPUC for Class III issuance, and 
submit independently verified M&V plans for the project before certificates will be 
issued. Once issued, the company can apply to the NEPOOL GIS for the requisite 
number of certificates to be deposited into their GIS account, at which point wholesalers 
seek buyers and, once found and a transaction completed, certificates can be transferred 
to the buyer’s account, which can then be used to demonstrate compliance to the DPUC.  
 
Collecting, verifying, and entering M&V project data into a tracking system can be 
costly, especially if data must be entered into a system manually. Each project might have 
a different verifier for its savings data, which can be similarly difficult to manage. Unlike 
RECs, which benefit from metered data verified through an ISO, there is no automated 
system for capturing savings data 
 
As markets develop, it is important that tracking systems are developed to be as 
compatible with one another as feasible, so that eventually trades between account-
holders of different systems can be completed. The lack of central planning in this respect 
for RECs has created some extra back-end difficulties five or more years into the 
development of REC tracking systems, because interregional trades were not fully 
accommodated. As a result, REC tracking systems have incompatibilities.  
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Length of Issuance Period, Up-front Issuance, and Banking Rules 
ESC programs anticipate incremental increases in savings that incorporate gains from the 
previous years. ESCs from a given project can be either reissued annually for a fixed 
number of years, which is the norm, or issued the entire lifetime’s worth of ESCs up 
front. The length of the lifetime may be based on a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
projects, such as a five- or 10-year maximum lifetime. Alternatively, lifetimes may be 
defined for individual technology types, reflecting the actual length of time during which 
savings can reasonably be expected for that type, based on the history of the project type 
and other variables. 
 
In determining the number of years for which a given project should be issued ESCs, 
policy makers often adopt a simplified approach with a predetermined number of years 
applied to all projects, regardless of the reality of how long the project would actually 
yield savings. This is a policy decision that again favors the value of simplicity and ease 
in planning, meant to reduce the administrative difficulty of implementation, instead of 
attempting to ascertain more specific, accurate savings measures.  
 
Some ESC plans, such as the voluntary program being developed by NYSERDA, grant 
the full complement of ESCs up front for the full value of the expected savings over the 
life of a project. This approach simplifies administration and maximizes the financial 
leverage ESCs can provide in shortening a project’s payback period as well as the 
chances of the project receiving the initial green light through up-front financing. But as a 
trade-off for accessing the full value up front and because of the time value of ESCs and 
the proceeds they can bring, such up-front issuances are normally discounted to some 
degree. On the other end of the spectrum is the granting of ESCs annually over the life of 
the project, as is the case in Italy, which does not incorporate future savings into ESC 
issuance. 
 
There also are significant differences in the number of years for which ESCs are granted. 
Italy grants ESCs for five years for most projects, but allows eight years worth of ESCs 
for certain projects, including passive cooling, thermal building insulation, and solar 
water heating, expected to generate savings for a longer average period of time. The 
normal Italian project lifetime of five years carries an implied obligation to maintain the 
measure for five years (Hamrin et al. 2007).  
 
In the United Kingdom, to minimize transaction costs, an up-front discounted savings is 
given to a project (based on its expected lifetime), which is used for the three-year 
compliance cycle in which the measure is implemented – this is similar to the NYSERDA 
approach.27 But the UK credits projects with long lifetime projected savings for the full 
lifetime of savings, even if it is 20 years, to provide ample incentives for such projects. 
 
The annual reissuing of ESCs for a given project, based on the additional savings the 
project is generating each year, should not be confused with the ability of ESC holders to 
bank ESCs for a period of time. “Banking” refers only to the timing of the sale of an 
                                                 
27 Because of the cost of capital and other factors, there is normally a discount factor applied when ESCs 
are issued up-front for their lifetime’s worth of savings. 
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ESC. For example, a seller unable to find the desired sale price or counterparty for a 
given sale or auction period may simply hold the ESC for a future sale, as allowed by the 
banking rules. For the five-year compliance period in Italy, the projects given five years 
worth of ESCs are also allowed unlimited banking; in other words, once issued, ESCs can 
be used in any compliance year within the five-year period. The new Michigan EEPS 
provides that ESCs created in one year may be carried forward to the next, but only to a 
maximum of one-third of that next year’s standard.28  
 
Alternative Compliance Payments (ACPs)  
EEPS policies in the United States do not generally include an “alternative compliance 
payment” (ACP); on the other hand, many U.S. state RPS policies do. An ACP is an 
amount of money required for each MWh an obligated party falls short of their 
requirement of renewable energy or energy efficiency. ACPs can also be used as a 
mechanism for supporting new efficiency projects by placing ACP dollars into an 
efficiency fund, for funding projects. For those states considering the use of ESCs, an 
ACP can help obligated parties to clarify the cost of noncompliance and, consequently, 
the value of projects that comply with the EEPS. Some states, such as California, have 
shareholder incentive structures, which reward utilities for exceeding their target, and in 
some cases, penalize them for falling short. Sanctions or penalties generally are an 
important part of compliance; it is necessary to make penalties large enough to 
incentivize requirements and ensure compliance.  
 
In Connecticut and in Europe, plan designers seek to set an ACP at a high enough level to 
ensure appropriate incentives for compliance. The first step in setting an ACP is an 
accurate assessment of the averages and ranges in the per-MWh cost of installed 
efficiency measures. It is one of the more difficult parameters to determine, because costs 
and values for energy efficiency measures vary greatly. In the end, ACPs need to be set at 
a level cost level few projects would exceed, to ensure that the proper incentive to pursue 
even high payback projects is in place. Too low an ACP could discourage project 
development. Connecticut, the only state with active ESC trading, has set both an ESC 
price floor ($10/MWh) and a ceiling in the form of an ACP ($31/MWh).   
 
In Italy, the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG) assesses compliance 
with targets and sets the price for noncompliance on a case-by-case basis (Pavan 2008). 
As a guideline, the ACP must be equal to or higher than the trading price. Interestingly, 
the Italian regulators do not define the value of the penalty in advance; it isn’t a reference 
price. The reason for this approach is to prevent the market from sending false signals 
about the real cost of energy saving. Rather, the policy objective is to allow maximum 
market responsiveness to the “moving target” market value of energy efficiency.  
Generally, AEEG looks at the average market price of certificates and the average cost of 
saving energy and sets an appropriate price. The revenue from the ACP in Italy goes 
toward educational programs about energy efficiency.  
                                                 
28 See Michigan Enrolled Senate Bill No. 213, Section 83 (3) (a).  
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Conclusions 
Early experiences with ESCs have demonstrated that they are worth careful 
consideration, especially in the context of EEPS compliance. In the United States, the 
ESCs may benefit from the confluence of several emerging factors: new state EEPS 
policies, public interest in tools to mitigate climate change, and the beginnings of interest 
in a voluntary market for ESCs.  
 
Voluntary markets can benefit from lessons learned in compliance markets, particularly 
with regard to M&V protocols and certification processes. The results from early pilot 
programs, such as NYSERDA’s, will be important to those considering emulating such 
programs. But for the voluntary market, the emergence of a credible, independent 
national certifying body and consistent set of protocols is paramount. Similarly, the 
success of early examples of the use of ESCs for EEPS compliance, such as the program 
in Connecticut, also will be watched closely by stakeholders. The staying power of 
European examples, particularly in Italy, already demonstrates that ESCs can bring added 
revenue and attention to energy efficiency. The European examples to date also indicate 
significantly higher prices for ESCs than the data available in the United States would 
indicate for the very limited U.S. market to date. 
 
Not entirely different from the early experience of REC markets, public and policy-maker 
perceptions of the ability to accurately capture and measure energy savings vary, and 
attempting to do so in the context of tradable certificates is still a new concept. ESCs will 
not be helped by a perception that measurement and verification is inconsistent or 
unreliable. For this reason, it is particularly important to the market’s future that a single, 
independent national certifying body promotes consistent practices that encompass both 
voluntary and compliance markets. Lessons from compliance markets also will be crucial 
for an emerging national voluntary market.  
 
The development of robust markets for ESCs will depend on consistency and clarity in 
standards and protocols as well as the ability of the industry to speak with a central voice.  
Ensuring that savings are real, verifiable, and additional is necessary for the market to 
gain credibility. Proper handling of the issue of free ridership is particularly important to 
preserve market integrity, especially on the voluntary side of the market, which depends 
so heavily on public perception.  
 
REC markets have shown that there may be potential to broaden and integrate markets 
for tradable commodities that represent a public good and an opportunity for consumers 
to “vote with their wallets.” ESCs can benefit from the traction that RECs have gained in 
the marketplace, along with the existing infrastructure developed for REC markets, such 
as tracking systems. These systems could be relatively easily modified to accommodate 
ESC trading. ESCs can also benefit from existing M&V protocols and other data acquired 
through long-standing efficiency and public benefit programs. But with a somewhat 
different value proposition, it is unclear whether ESCs will mirror RECs market progress. 
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Making use of these existing structures is crucial for ESC regimes to succeed, given that 
transaction costs are perhaps the single greatest market hurdle for ESCs to overcome. 
Keeping administrative, certification, and tracking costs low will enable market traction, 
given the relatively low profit margins to be expected with the product. Large programs 
that involve more parties also can help to diffuse these costs and help ensure adequate 
M&V oversight. The importance of leveraging existing M&V data and structures is 
amply demonstrated in both the Connecticut and NYSERDA examples, where ESC 
programs benefit from M&V protocols enacted by public benefit funds developed over a 
long period of time to implement energy efficiency measures. As these very new 
programs develop, other states can draw from these programs’ experiences in attempting 
to replicate their successes.  
 
There are strong motivating influences at work to promote a variety of mechanisms that 
support increased energy savings. Although the timing may be good for ESCs to move 
toward greater public and policy-maker acceptance and eventually toward some critical 
mass, ESCs also face obstacles to that acceptance that go beyond those of RECs. For the 
voluntary market that has played a key role in REC development, ESCs have an 
essentially challenging value proposition: selling the environmental benefits of a measure 
that has already bestowed a personal benefit of savings on the seller. It is too soon to 
know whether the benefits of ESCs will ultimately outweigh those challenges. As the 
general public and policy makers continue to warm to the idea of requirements that build 
in market-based flexibility, such as REC and carbon offset trading, the potential exists for 
ESCs to play a role in expanding markets for energy efficiency. 
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